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Soft Law’s Failure on the Horizon: The International Code of 
Conduct for Outer Space Activities 
 
By Jack M. Beard 
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                                                         ABSTRACT 
 
On January 11, 2007, the People’s Republic of China conducted a successful test of an 
anti-satellite weapon against one of its own aging weather satellites that produced a 
massive cloud of long-lasting orbital debris in space.  The test highlighted both the 
growing possibility that orbital debris may ultimately render space unusable for all 
activities there and the reality of an increasingly militarized, contested and insecure 
geopolitical space environment.  Largely in response to this incident, and in an effort to 
enhance the safety, security and sustainability of space activities, the European Union 
developed a draft “International Code of Conduct for Activities in Outer Space” (the 
ICoC or the Code) in 2008.  The proposed Code, which continues to be debated by the 
international community, is an example of a legally non-binding "soft law" instrument 
which also contains broad, imprecise statements of principles.  While soft law has made 
important contributions to the legal and administrative framework that governs space, the 
Code does not hold such promise.  Instead, this article argues that the Code is a case 
study in the limitations of soft law, particularly when employed as a mechanism to 
regulate military activities and weapons in a highly insecure environment.  Moreover, it 
is notably ill-suited in this context and in its design to successfully address the critical 
problem of orbital space debris.  As a soft law instrument with both soft law’s general 
limitations and its own particular shortcomings, the Code is an ineffective measure that 
distracts attention from more meaningful initiatives to reduce orbital debris while at the 
same time risking increasing tensions in space, diminishing the existing legal framework 
governing space activities, and negatively affecting the future development of space law.     
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                         Soft Law’s Failure on the Horizon:  
                            The International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities 
 
                                                               By Jack M. Beard 
   
 
            Part I: Introduction
 
Satellites and other spacecraft have quietly become an essential part of the world’s 
infrastructure and now play an indispensable role in our everyday lives, empowering countless 
services ranging from communications to banking, weather reports, safety functions and 
navigation.1  Perhaps more ominously, however, space has also become a vital military domain as 
space systems represent invaluable national security assets for the United States and other 
countries.2  Space is in fact so fundamental to modern American military power that U.S. defense 
officials have suggested that without space systems, “many of our most important military 
advantages evaporate.”3 
 
The militarization of space has proceeded in spite of the peaceful purposes which were 
established for its exploration and use in the first legal instrument developed to govern space 
activities.4  Even though states are committed to use space only for “peaceful purposes,” this 
ambiguous phrase has historically been subject to competing interpretations.5  The prevailing 
                                                 
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law; former Associate Deputy General Counsel 
(International Affairs), Department of Defense.  The author wishes to thank Alex Lierz and Taylor Brooks for their 
excellent research assistance and greatly appreciates helpful comments by Frans von der Dunk, Matthew Schaefer, 
Steve Willborn, Brian Lepard, and Richard Moberly on prior drafts of this article. 
1 Satellite Database, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, (Feb. 1, 2015), http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons _ 
and_global_security/solutions/space-weapons/ucs-satellite-database.html#.VaLcwUZMJ5Y; Space Debris: Orbital 
Debris Threatens Sustainable Use of Space, UNITED NATIONS (2008), http://www.un.org/en/events/ 
tenstories/08/spacedebris.shtml. 
2 William J. Lynn, III, [former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense], A Military Strategy for the New Space 
Environment, 34 WASH. Q. 7 (Summer 2011) (“Space systems enable our modern way of war. They allow our 
warfighters to strike with precision, to navigate with accuracy, to communicate with certainty, and to see the 
battlefield with clarity.”). 
3 Id.  
4 See, e.g., Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies [the Outer Space Treaty], Preamble, opened for signature on Dec. 18, 
1979, entered into force July 11, 1984, 1363 UNTS 3 (“Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the 
progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.”). 
5 P.K. MENON, THE UNITED NATIONS’ EFFORTS TO OUTLAW THE ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE: A BRIEF HISTORY 
WITH KEY DOCUMENTS 29, 34 (1988) (noting that interpretation of the phrase “peaceful purposes” has been a highly 
controversial problem since the beginning of the space age – with one principal school of thought holding that the 
phrase refers to “nonmilitary use” and the other holding that it refers to “nonaggressive use.”). 
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interpretation, which allows the use of space “for military purposes as long as they are not 
aggressive in character,” has left space open to diverse and expanding military activities.6   
 
Rather than a hoped-for, peaceful utopia, space thus continues to evolve into a highly 
militarized, contested and dangerously insecure domain in which many states view each other’s 
activities there with great suspicion and seek to counter growing, perceived threats.  As U.S. 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work recently observed in announcing the creation of a new 
U.S. space operations center, China and Russia “present us with unique and increasingly stressing 
military challenges” and suggested that although space had once been a “virtual sanctuary,” it 
must now “be considered a contested operational domain in ways that we haven’t had to think 
about in the past.”7 
 
Other countries, however, have voiced their own concerns about U.S. military activities in 
space.  On Oct. 17, 2014, a remote-controlled X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle (dubbed a “secret space 
plane”) completed a record-setting 674-day mission orbiting earth as it performed classified 
missions for the U.S. Air Force.8  In spite of the secrecy surrounding the project, Pentagon 
officials denied that the plane has “anything to do with space weapons.”9  Suspicious foreign 
observers, especially in Russia and China, disagree.  Many of them view the X-37B space plane 
as a prototype of a new space weapon which may be capable of disabling or destroying satellites 
and other targets in space or on earth.10   
 
For its part, the U.S. Government consistently reaffirms its support of the peaceful 
exploration and use of outer space, but also asserts its right to “prevent and deter aggression 
against space infrastructure that supports U.S. national security.”11  Unfortunately, it is often fear 
that seems to dominate the views of potential U.S. adversaries as they assess new U.S. military 
projects in space like the X-37B.12  Such fears predictably generate counter-measures by 
                                                 
6 Id., at 35 (noting that the Soviet Union and the United States ultimately chose to preserve discretion in the 
interpretation of the term” peaceful purposes” and agreed that space “can be used for military purposes so long as 
they are not aggressive in character.”). 
7 Marcus Weisgerber & Patrick Tucker, Pentagon Rushing to Open Space-War Center to Counter China, Russia, 
(June 23, 2015), http://www.defenseone.com/management/2015/06/pentagon-preparing-war-space-russia-
china/116101/ (also noting that “The ugly reality that we must now all face is that if an adversary were able to take 
space away from us, our ability to project decisive power across transoceanic distances and overmatch adversaries in 
theaters once we get there … would be critically weakened.”). 
8 Alan Yuhas, X-37B Secret Space Plane's Mission Remains Mystery Outside US Military, THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 27, 
2014, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/oct/26/x37b-us-military-secret-space-plane-mission. 
9 William J. Broad, Surveillance is Suspected as Main Role of Spacecraft, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/science/space/23secret.html?_r=0.  
10 See, e.g., Top-secret X-37B Spacecraft Lands after Nearly Two Years in Orbit, RT (Russian News), Oct. 17, 2014, 
http://rt.com/usa/196988-air-force-space-plane-lands/. 
11 See National Security Space Strategy: Unclassified Summary, U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE (2011), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/home/ features/2011/0111nsss/docs/NationalSecuritySpaceStrategyUnclassified 
SummaryJan2011.pdf [hereinafter National Security Space Strategy]. 
12 See, e.g., Fred Weir, Can Russia Rival the X-37B Space Plane with its Own Robotic Spacecraft?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR, Feb. 3, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2011/0203/Can-Russia-rival-the-X-37B-space-
plane-with-its-own-robotic-spacecraft (noting that “[m]ost Russian media coverage about the mini-shuttle [the X-
37B] was dominated by fear.”). 
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threatened states (such as developing their own variant of the X-37B), leading in turn to the 
prospect of an arms race in space.13  
 
Fear, suspicion, perceived threats, and continuing allegations of hostile acts continue to 
undermine the status of space as a secure and peaceful domain.  In 2012, Russian officials 
claimed that a Russian satellite had been disabled by a secret weapon, presumably operated by the 
United States.14  More recently, Russia has refused to respond to inquiries regarding a 
“mysterious object” launched by the Russian military which has engaged in various sophisticated 
maneuvers and is described as “stoking fears over the revival of a defunct Kremlin project to 
destroy satellites.”15  Meanwhile, back on earth, several states continue to employ technologies 
that interfere with satellite transmissions for various political purposes.16 
 
It is in this insecure environment that the international community now confronts a serious 
and growing threat to all future uses of space, the problem of orbital space debris.17  Space debris 
consists of all manner of “junk” left in space, including defunct satellites, rocket stages used in 
previous launches, nose cones, payload covers, shrouds, bolts, solid propellant slag, space activity 
cast-aways, deterioration fragments (peeled paint, etc.) and fragments from exploding batteries, 
fuel tanks, and collisions.18  Even the smallest piece of debris, travelling at speeds of many 
thousands of kilometers per hour, has the potential to damage or destroy a spacecraft or harm an 
astronaut and can remain in orbit for hundreds or even thousands of years (depending on its 
altitude and related orbital drag and decay).19  
 
In an ominous development in February 2009,  the first major collision of two satellites in 
orbit occurred (a defunct Russian communications satellite and an operational US satellite, each 
travelling at 17,500 miles an hour), creating a huge cloud of space debris that may threaten 
                                                 
13 See, e.g., Lewis Page, Russia has 'Secret Space Warplane to Match US X-37B, THE REGISTER, Feb. 4, 2011, 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/02/04/x37b_ski/. 
14 See, e.g., Andrew E. Kramer, Russia’s Failed Mars Probe Crashes Into Pacific, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2012 (noting 
a Russian space official’s speculation that the Phobos-Grunt satellite might have been hit by an ASAT weapon); 
Andrew E. Kramer, Russian Official Suggests Weapon Caused Exploration Spacecraft’s Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
10, 2012 (noting the Russian allegation that US radar installations in Alaska might have damaged the Phobos-Grunt 
satellite.). 
15 Sam Jones, Object 2014-28E – Space Junk or Russian Satellite Killer?, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 17, 2014, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/cdd0bdb6-6c27-11e4-990f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3MeMsL2Nr. 
16 Lynn, supra note 2, at 7-16 (noting how satellite broadcasts by the BBC and other organizations have been 
disrupted by states such as Libya and Iran and that “even less technologically developed countries such as Ethiopia 
have employed jamming technologies for political purposes.”).  
17 Press Statement, Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State (Jan. 17, 2012) (“The long-term sustainability of our 
space environment is at serious risk from space debris and irresponsible actors.”) [hereinafter Press Statement, Sec’y 
of State Clinton], http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/01/180969.htm.  
18 On Growing Threat Of Space Debris, European Space Agency, http://www.esa.int/Our_Activities/ 
Operations/Space_Debris/Focus_on_growing_threat_of_space_debris/ (noting that space is clogged with the leftovers 
from the near-5000 launches by all spacefaring nations since the start of the space age); Space Debris: Orbital Debris 
Threatens Sustainable Use of Space, supra note 1. 
19 Space Debris: Orbital Debris Threatens Sustainable Use of Space, supra note 1. 
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orbiting spacecraft for decades.20  The junkyard of space debris orbiting earth is now so extensive 
that many more collisions are expected, at an increasingly frequent rate.21 
 
 The precarious security situation in space has dramatically contributed to the threat posed 
by orbiting space debris.  In 2007, the People’s Republic of China demonstrated its military 
capabilities and stunned the international community by conducting an anti-satellite weapon 
(ASAT) test against one of its own aging weather satellites, generating a massive cloud of 
orbiting space debris that now poses a collision risk to all spacecraft in or passing through low 
earth orbit. 22  According to the Chief Scientist and Program Manager of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) Orbital Debris Program Office, "This is by far the worst 
satellite fragmentation in the history of the space age, in the past 50 years…Many of these debris 
will be in orbit for 100 years or more because the altitude of the breakup was so high.”23   
 
The debris-generating Chinese ASAT test in 2007 and the growing threat posed by orbital 
space debris prompted the international community to reexamine the existing international legal 
and administrative framework that regulates military and civilian activities in outer space.  This 
framework is founded on two sets of authorities: “hard law” and “soft law.”  The hard law space 
regime consists of legally binding rules, drawn principally from a small set of multilateral 
agreements (the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue Agreement, the Liability Convention, the 
Registration Convention and the Moon Treaty) and the body of customary international law.24   
 
Since the conclusion of the last of multilateral convention in 1979, however, the 
international community has been unable to achieve any new, legally binding agreements to 
govern space activities (and the most recently concluded multilateral convention, the Moon 
                                                 
20 Id.; William J. Broad, Debris Spews into Space after Satellites Collide, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009 (noting that the 
Russian and American communications satellites “cracked up in silent destruction” and that the American Iridium 
satellite was part of a constellation of 66 spacecraft.). 
21 Christian Torres, Report Says Space Debris Past ‘Tipping Point,’ NASA Needs to Step up Action, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 1, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/reports-says-space-debris-past-tipping-point-
nasa-needs-to-step-up-action/2011/08/31/gIQAo6WTuJ_story.html (further noting the possibility that if debris 
reaches a “critical mass,” it could set off a chain reaction of more collisions, resulting in a cascading effect in which 
debris would continually collide with one another and create even more debris.). 
22 William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, Flexing Muscle, China Destroys Satellite in Test,  N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/19/world/asia/19china.html?; NASA Orbital Debris Program Office, Fengyun-1C 
Debris: Two Years Later, 13 ORBITAL DEBRIS Q. NEWS 2 (Jan. 2009) available at http://orbital 
debris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv13i1.pdf (further noting that the Fengyun-1C debris cloud accounted for 
more than 25% of all cataloged objects in Low Earth Orbit in 2008, with 400 objects still to be catalogued.). 
23 Frank Morring, Jr., China ASAT Test Called Worst Single Debris Event Ever, AVIATION WEEK, Feb 11, 2007, 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1790313/posts.  The orbit of a particular satellite is a function of its 
mission.  Most satellites in low earth orbit operate at altitudes of hundreds of kilometers up to around 1,000 km. The 
lower the altitude, the greater the atmospheric drag.  This drag slows a satellite and will eventually decay its orbit and 
force it to fall to earth (unless the satellite has maneuvering capabilities).  See DAVID WRIGHT, LAURA GREGO & 
LISBETH GRONLUND, THE PHYSICS OF SPACE SECURITY: A REFERENCE MANUAL 29, 39-40 (2005).  
24 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return 
of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119; Convention on 
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187; 
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T.695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15; 
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon & Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 
3, 18 I.L.M. 1434. 
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Treaty, has been ratified by only sixteen countries.)25  In place of legally binding agreements, a 
wide variety of non-binding “soft law” instruments have been developed for space activities, 
variously described as “non-binding principles, norms, standards or other statements of expected 
behavior in the form of recommendations, charters, terms of reference, guidelines, codes of 
conduct, etc.”26   
 
In light of the obstacles that have prevented states from concluding legally binding 
agreements to govern space activities, some authors have suggested that soft law initiatives 
should be embraced “as the best hope for pragmatic progress in a highly politically charged 
environment.”27  It has also been suggested that soft law has emerged as the “most appropriate 
tool” for ensuring the security of space objects and preventing an arms race in space.28   
 
The shocking, destructive Chinese ASAT test in 2007 inspired the European Union to 
develop a soft law instrument, a non-binding code of conduct, to promote more responsible 
behavior in space.29  The European Code of Conduct for Activities in Outer Space was formally 
proposed on December 17, 2008.30  After three subsequent revisions, the latest draft (March 31, 
2014) is now referred to as the International Code of Conduct for Activities in Outer Space 
Activities (the “ICOC” or the “Code”).31   
 
Invoking the benefits of soft law, many scholars, government officials and other 
commentators support the adoption of the Code and consider it (or similar codes) to be the right 
step forward in order to ensure more responsible behavior in space.32   Toward this end, the Code 
                                                 
25 Status of International Agreements relating to Activities in Outer Space as at 1 Jan 2015, http://www.unoosa. 
org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_2015_CRP08E.pdf.  
26 Marco Ferrazzani, Soft Law in Space Activities – An Updated View, in SOFT LAW IN OUTER SPACE: THE FUNCTION 
OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 99, 100 (Irmgard Marboe ed., 2012) [hereinafter SOFT LAW 
IN SPACE]; Dinah L. Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L 291, 319 (2006) (noting 
that the term "soft law" is often used to denote principles, standards, or arrangements of a non-legally binding 
nature.). 
27 See, e.g., Ben Baseley-Walker, Analyzing International Reactions to Soft Law Initiatives on Space Security, in 
SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 26, at 387, 394. 
28 See, e.g., Fabio Tronchetti, A Soft Law Approach to Prevent the Weaponization of Outer Space, in SOFT LAW IN 
SPACE, supra note 26, at 361, 372. 
29 Jana Robinson, Europe’s Space Diplomacy Initiative: The International Code of Conduct, in DECODING THE 
INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 27 (Ajey Lele ed., 2012) [hereinafter DECODING 
THE CODE] (“The Code was largely stimulated by the troubling display of non-transparency and insensitivity to the 
space environment shown by China in its 2007 anti-satellite test.”). 
30 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions and the draft Code of Conduct for outer space activities, 
Annex II, ST 17175 2008 INIT (Dec. 17, 2008), available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l= 
EN&f=ST%2017175%202008%20INIT. 
31 Council of the European Union, Version March 31, 2014, Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space 
Activities, available at http://eeas.europa. eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/pdf/space_code_ 
conduct_draft_vers_31-march-2014_en.pdf [hereinafter Code].  Previous revised versions were proposed on October 
11, 2010, and September 16, 2013.   
32 See, e.g., Park Won-hwa, Space Code of Conduct: Right Step Forward Although Not Perfect, in DECODING THE 
CODE,  supra note 29, at 101, 103 (describing the Code, in spite of its limitations, as a “positive milestone for 
humankind”); Victoria Samson, The ICOC: A Starting Point, in AWAITING LAUNCH: PERSPECTIVES ON THE DRAFT 
ICOC FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 69 (Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan & Daniel A. Porras eds., 2014) [hereinafter 
AWAITING LAUNCH] (“While the ICoC is not perfect, it is an excellent start to the conversation on what major space 
stakeholders believe to be responsible use of space…”); Press Statement, Sec’y of State Clinton, supra note 17 (“A 
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employs its own soft law approach to address numerous issues, including those found in two 
related but very different subject matter areas: the critical problem of orbital space debris and the 
challenge of preventing an arms race in space. The Code unfortunately fails in its attempts to 
achieve progress in either of these areas and instead undermines such efforts. 
  
While various soft law instruments have made positive contributions to different aspects 
of space law, this article argues that the Code does not hold such promise.   On the contrary, the 
Code is a case study in the limitations of soft law, particularly when employed as a mechanism to 
regulate military activities and weapons in a highly insecure environment. Moreover, it is notably 
ill-suited in this context and in its design to successfully address the critical problem of orbital 
space debris.  As an instrument with soft law’s limitations and its own particular shortcomings, 
the Code is thus an ineffective and distracting measure that risks increasing tensions in space 
while diminishing existing and future space regimes.  
 
The article is organized as follows. Part II briefly discusses the ascendance of soft law as a 
design choice in building international regimes and the important role that it has played in the 
formation of space law and regulatory frameworks related to space activities.  Next, this part 
concisely reviews the Code framework, particularly as it relates to military and security concerns 
and the promotion of arms control objectives. 
 
Part III presents the argument that soft law is generally a problematic design choice for 
arms control initiatives and is ill-equipped to address contentious security issues in an unstable 
geopolitical environment.  The argument proceeds by analyzing the negative effects of soft law 
design choices that weaken instruments such as the Code along the dimensions of precision and 
obligation.  The impact of these design choices on compliance may also vary with respect to the 
political systems that embrace them, raising questions about possible disadvantages for 
democratic states (and their open societies) when they undertake in good faith to implement 
politically significant but legally non-binding arms control commitments.    
 
Part IV carries the analysis one step further, arguing that the Code is a particularly 
problematic soft law variant for addressing critical space problems, notably space debris.  In 
advancing this argument, central features of the Code are assessed, including the manner in which 
this diplomatically-driven, or “top-down” soft law instrument is layered upon current, more 
effective “bottom-up” soft law initiatives, creating a counterproductive and confusing “soft-on-
soft law” phenomenon.  Furthermore, as a practical matter, the Code has failed to attract the 
support of several key spacefaring states, raising the prospect of a fractional soft law variant that 
is unable to address key security issues and instead risks increasing tensions in space.   
 
The Code presents one last intriguing soft law predicament based on its promotion as a 
“non-binding” yet “norm-creating” instrument.  As a legally non-binding document, the Code 
skirts legislative participation in subscribing democratic states where legislatures normally 
approve, authorize or otherwise participate in the conclusion of legally binding agreements.  To 
the extent that the Code, along with subsequent state practice, generates new legally binding 
norms of customary international law, it would thus enlarge a “democracy deficit” in the 
                                                                                                                                                               
Code of Conduct will help maintain the long-term sustainability, safety, stability, and security of space by 
establishing guidelines for the responsible use of space.”). 
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formation of those rules and could have far-reaching negative consequences.  The Code’s 
heralded non-binding yet norm-creating status has given rise to an unprecedented conflict 
between the executive and legislative branches in the United States.  This conflict threatens to 
undermine not only U.S. support for the Code, but also the leading role that the United States has 
played in the development of space law since the beginning of the space era.     
 
Part V offers some thoughts on principles to guide states as they take the next step in 
developing new instruments to better address the critical threat posed by space debris while also 
grappling with separate but closely related security and arms control issues in space.  Finally, Part 
VI concludes with reflections on the most serious problems confronting the international 
community in space and how the Code unfortunately represents more of an obstacle than a 
meaningful solution to these problems. 
 
Part II: The Ascendance of Soft Law and Its Role in Outer Space  
 
A. Choosing Soft Law 
 
 In contrast to the protracted negotiations that are often required to conclude legally 
binding agreements, the process associated with developing soft law has been described as a 
faster and easier alternative for states to address shared problems and overcome political 
obstacles.33  One common explanation for the ease with which states are able to conclude soft law 
instruments is the flexibility afforded by a soft law, an attribute that some authors also suggest is 
particularly useful for dealing with the challenges of space.34 
 
Soft law instruments may thus enjoy the benefits of great flexibility and may be concluded 
quickly through a variety of methods, particularly by employing indeterminate terms that help 
avoid lengthy debates about controversial key phrases and definitions.35   Vague, ambiguous, 
imprecise or otherwise indeterminate language used in international instruments is often 
categorized by scholars as a form of “soft law.”36  Soft law documents may thus take many forms 
as they are weakened along one or more dimensions, including obligation and precision.37  
                                                 
33 Christian Olarean, Cyber Threats to Space Systems: Why Cyber in Space Security?, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra 
note 32, at 101, 104 (noting how non-legally binding tools and frameworks provide greater flexibility than binding 
treaties and permit timely movement towards solutions on issues “where political obstacles can make the negotiation 
of legal instruments a protracted process.”); Ferrazzani, supra note 26, at 105 (arguing that soft law instruments 
“foster international cooperation by offering simper, faster and more flexible terms.”).  
34 Ferrazzani, supra note 26, at 117 (describing the practice of soft law as “a virtuous system that is flexible, 
corresponding to the needs of the space community…”). 
35 Wolfgang Rathgeber et al., Space security and the European Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, UNIDIR 
DISARMAMENT FORUM, no. 4, 2009, at 34, available at http://www.unidir.org/files/ publications/pdfs/a-safer-space-
environment-en-325.pdf  (noting that “because it constitutes soft law, a code of conduct is easier to agree to and 
potentially avoids lengthy discussions about definitions...”). 
36 Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law? 77 AM. J. INT’L L 413, 414-15 n.7 (1983) 
(stating that "[i] t would seem better to reserve the term 'soft law' for rules that are imprecise and not really 
compelling"); Shelton, supra note 26, at 319 (noting that "[t]he term 'soft law' is also sometimes employed to refer to 
the weak, vague, or poorly drafted content of a binding instrument");  Edith Brown Weiss, Introduction to 
INTERNATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH NONBINDING ACCORDS 1, 3 (Edith Brown Weiss ed., 1997) (noting that soft law 
can also refer to hortatory language). 
37 See R. R. Baxter, International Law in Her "Infinite Variety," 29 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 549 (1980) (suggesting that 
"soft law" can manifest itself in an "infinite variety" of forms); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft 
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Although soft law instruments are often characterized by diminished obligations (since 
they are legally non-binding documents) and/or imprecise language, they may nonetheless be able 
to significantly influence the behavior and conduct of states.38  Scholars who describe the benefits 
of soft law point in particular to the ability of soft law instruments to help states and international 
organizations build new international norms, including new norms of space law.39  Such 
capabilities are also invoked by commentators who suggest that soft law initiatives should be 
embraced as “a key building block for norm-setting and regulation of the outer space 
environment.”)40   
 
 Advocates of the Code thus argue that one of its greatest strengths is its status as a soft 
law instrument, suggesting that it “can help define responsible activities and set out agreed norms 
of behaviour when legally binding agreements cannot be reached.”41  Proponents further predict 
that the Code will establish a solid foundation for such progress and be able to serve as “an 
essential normative instrument to harmonize the interests of space-faring and non-space-faring 
countries.”42  Similarly, senior U.S. officials now posit that “the development and negotiation of a 
code could play an important role in building international political consensus and understanding 
around key concepts of responsible behavior.”43 
  
                                                                                                                                                               
Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 422 (2000) (emphasizing that "'soft law' begins once legal 
arrangements are weakened along one or more of the dimensions of obligation, precision, and delegation"). 
38 Christian Brunner & Georg Konigsberger, ‘Regulatory Impact Assessment’ — A Tool to Strengthen Soft Law 
Regulations, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 26, at 90; Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of 
International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1880 (2002) ("[M]any instruments that are not considered 'law' under the 
classical definition have a substantial impact on the behavior of states.");  Nina-Louisa Remuss, Space and Security, 
in OUTER SPACE IN SOCIETY, POLITICS AND LAW 519, 539 (Christian Brünner & Alexander Soucek eds., 2011) 
(noting that even though a code of conduct is soft law, it “can still give significant impetus to both national and 
international political processes.”). 
39 See, e.g., Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT’L L 259, 269 
(1992) (describing soft law solutions as "useful steps on a longer journey" and the point where "international law and 
international politics combine to build new norms"); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International Law and 
international Relations Theory: A New Generation of lnterdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT’L L 367 (1998) 
(emphasizing the advantages of nonbinding soft law in the context of international governance and the generation of 
norms by supranational institutions and their dissemination by nongovernmental organizations); OGUNSOLA O. 
OGUNBANWO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES 17-21 (1975) (noting how in the early space era, 
some non-legally binding U.N. General Assembly resolutions were widely recognized as codifying existing key 
international law principles while others paved the way for important legally binding agreements or served as a 
source of customary international law based on the practice of states.). 
40 See, e.g., Baseley-Walker, supra note 27, at 394. 
41 See, e.g., Beatrice Fihn & Gabriella Irsten, Addressing Challenges in Space through New Multilateral Processes, in 
AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 32, at 119, 121. 
42 Jessica Los Banos, EU Code of Conduct on Activities in Outer Space: Issues that Matter, in DECODING THE CODE, 
supra note 29, at 97, 100; See also Olarean, supra note 33, at 104 (noting that “non-binding tools can be used as a 
mechanism for harmonising national laws and practices, allowing states to move towards adherence, while keeping 
within their economic and technological capacities.”).  
43 Gregory L. Schulte [U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Space Policy] & Audrey M. Schaffer, [U.S. Space 
Policy Advisor in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Space Policy] Enhancing Security by Promoting 
Responsible Behavior in Space, 6 STRATEGIC STUD. Q., no. 1, at 9, 14 (2012). 
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B. The Legal Significance of Soft Law   
 
So-called norms and standards of responsible behavior which are set forth in soft law 
instruments are, by definition, not legally binding.44 Yet soft law principles may nonetheless 
ultimately have legal significance through a variety of processes.    
 
First, soft law principles may assist in the interpretation and application of existing space 
law treaties and other obligations.45  For example, Article XII of the 1972 Liability Convention 
provides that compensation to be paid by a launching state for damages caused by space objects, 
including damages caused by space objects “carrying a nuclear power source on board,” shall be 
“determined in accordance with international law and principles of justice and equity…”46  The 
text of the Liability Convention, however, is unclear whether such compensation includes 
reimbursement of expenses incurred for search, recovery and cleanup operations.47  
 
In order to assist in the interpretation of language in legally binding agreements, including 
Article XII of the Liability Convention, states may make recourse under Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties to “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation.”48  In the case of the 
Liability Convention, such subsequent practice can be found in Principle 9.3 of the non-legally 
binding 1992 Declaration of Principles relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power in Outer Space, 
which provides that compensation for damage caused by space objects or their component parts 
“shall include reimbursement of the duly substantiated expenses for search, recovery and cleanup 
operations…”49  Although this specification of reimbursable expenses is contained in a soft law 
instrument, the fact that the instrument had been adopted by all the states parties to the Liability 
Convention “can be regarded as an expression of subsequent practice in the application of the 
Convention,” making it an authoritative basis for interpreting the Convention.50    
 
Second, soft law instruments setting forth various technical standards, guidelines or 
regulations may create obligations of a procedural nature.51  Although these technical standards, 
guidelines and regulations lack legally binding force, they nonetheless may have “factual 
                                                 
44 Ferrazzani, supra note 26, at 116 (referring to these non-binding principles as “light norms.”). 
45 Id.; David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, AM. J. INT’L L 901, 914 (2003) (noting the impact of soft law on 
the interpretation of treaties and on the establishment of customary international law in areas such as human rights). 
46 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 
U.N.T.S. 187. 
47 Faustino Pocar, The Normative Role of UNCOPUOS, in OUTLOOK ON SPACE LAW OVER THE NEXT 30 YEARS:  
ESSAYS PUBLISHED FOR THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY 415, 420 (Daphné Crowther & 
Gabriel Lafferranderie eds., 1997). 
48 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art. 31.3.b. 
49 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, Principle 9.3, 23 I.L.M. 917 (1992); 
Recommended to U.N. GADR, 47th Sess., U.N.Doc. A/47/20 (1992). 
50 Pocar, supra note 47, at 420 (further noting that declarations of principles on outer space adopted by the General 
Assembly “play a significant role within treaty law, despite their non-binding nature, as far as they contribute to 
clarify the scope of rights and obligations expressed in treaties and conventions.).     
51 Ferrazzani, supra note 26, at 116. 
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effects.”52  For example, with respect to the regulation of satellite networks, the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) issues numerous recommendations and other decisions which 
are non-binding, but states may find themselves forced to comply with these recommendations 
and decisions “due to pure necessity of compliance.”53  Non-compliance could in fact “lead to 
severe consequences up to complete isolation from the telecommunications world due to non-
matching standards or outdated equipment.”54  (ITU recommendations and regulations also help 
to illustrate the first point noted above, since they have enjoyed legal significance when employed 
as supplementary means of interpretation by arbitral tribunals and other adjudicating bodies, 
including World Trade Organization adjudicating bodies.)55  
 
Third, soft law instruments setting forth various technical standards, guidelines or 
regulations can lead to harmonized international procedural standards that in turn may generate 
legally binding domestic legislation and regulations (including domestic licensing requirements 
and other administrative procedures).56  In the area of space law, such soft law procedural 
initiatives have clearly served as an incentive for states to create coordinated national space 
legislation and regulations.57  For example, the 1986 U.N. General Assembly Resolution on 
“Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space” has played such a role.58  
Although this resolution is non-binding, its principles are widely accepted and have been 
incorporated in the legally binding domestic licensing regulations of numerous states.59  They are 
thus recognized, for the most part, as international obligations in the U.S. space regulatory 
regime, which requires those persons licensed to operate any private remote-sensing space system 
to comply with key principles set forth in the resolution.60 
 
                                                 
52 Christian Brünner & George Kőnigsberger, Regulatory Impact Assessment – A Tool to Strengthen Soft Law 
Regulations, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 26, at 87, 89 (further noting that “the decisive factor is not the form 
of regulation, but the ‘substance’ and the intention to regulate and influence behavior and conduct.”). 
53 Jens Hinricher, The Law-Making of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) - Providing a New Source of 
International Law?, 64 HEIDELBERG J. OF INT’L L. 489, 499, 501 (2004) (further noting that because of the 
complicated underlying technical issues and the ITU’s general reputation for expertise and accuracy, the “non-
binding decisions of the ITU are commonly accepted by its members as if they were binding.”). 
54 Id., at 499. 
55 Yusuf Aksar, International Economic Law, in IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THROUGH 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS 1, 41-42 (Yusuf Aksar ed., 2011) (“Regulations and recommendations of the 
ITU are among the best fitting soft law instruments in international law.”). 
56 Setsuko Aoki, The Function of ‘Soft Law’ in the Development of International Space Law, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, 
supra note 26, at 57, 63 (noting that the “subcategory” of “soft law for the harmonization of national laws” includes 
“the tacit understanding…that soft law should remain as a standard for the elaboration of national law.”).  
57 Ferrazzani, supra note 26, at 117.   
58 Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, U.N Doc. A/RES/41/65 (1986). 
59 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, A Brief Overview of Norms Development in Outer Space, 3 
(2012), http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/a-brief-overview-of-norms-development-in-outer-space-en-
462.pdf (“The Remote Sensing Principles have also been incorporated into numerous national, regional, and 
multilateral laws and policies, including those of France, Japan, India, Thailand, and the United States of America.”). 
60 Michael Hoversten, U.S. National Security and Government Regulation of Commercial Remote Sensing from Outer 
Space, 50 A.F.L. REV. 253, 263-264 (2001).  Under U.S. law, no person subject to U.S. jurisdiction may directly or 
indirectly operate any private remote-sensing space system without first obtaining the appropriate license from the 
Department of Commerce. 15 CFR 5601; see also, JULIAN HERMIDA, LEGAL BASIS FOR A NATIONAL SPACE 
LEGISLATION 96 (2004). 
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Fourth, soft law instruments seeking to frame new norms of cooperation may later form 
the basis of legally binding international agreements.61  This phenomenon was notably 
demonstrated in the early era of space exploration when several key principles set forth in non-
binding U.N. General Assembly Resolutions were subsequently codified in legally binding 
multilateral agreements governing activities in space.62  For example, the foundational “non-
appropriation principle,” barring states from claiming sovereignty over outer space and celestial 
bodies, was first expressed in a U.N. General Assembly Resolution in 1961 and subsequently 
formed the basis of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty.63    
 
Fifth, specific provisions in a soft law instrument may eventually crystallize into rules of 
customary international law.64  Several U.N. General Assembly resolutions conspicuously served 
this purpose early in the space era.65  Widely accepted non-binding technical standards, guidelines 
and other regulations, such as ITU decisions and recommendations, may also be cited as evidence 
of general state practice, helping to potentially shape and form rules of customary international 
law.66  Soft law’s role in sometimes contributing to the formation of customary international law 
has thus been an important factor in the development of space law and proponents of the Code 
point to the likelihood (in their view) of provisions in the Code eventually becoming binding rules 
of customary international law.67  
 
                                                 
61 Ferrazzani, supra note 26, at 116-117 (noting how soft law may help in “the process of early elaboration of detailed 
obligations to be subsequently formalized under the law of international agreements.”).  
62 OGUNBANWO, supra note 39, at 17-21. 
63 U.N. General Assembly Resolution in 1721 (A) (XVI) on International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Space 
(1961); Steven Freeland, The Role of ‘Soft Law’ in Public International Law and its Relevance to the International 
Legal Regulation of Outer Space, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 26, at 9, 26 (further noting that the non-
appropriation principle may have achieved the status of a rule of customary international law even before the 
adoption of the General Assembly Resolution 1721 and the conclusion of the Outer Space Treaty).  
64 Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law, 38 INT'L & 
COMP. L.Q. 850, 857; see also Freeland, supra note 62, at 26 (also noting that soft law provisions “may even be 
declaratory of customary international law in certain circumstances”). 
65 Vereshchetin & Danilenko, infra note 285, at 25 (noting that “the acceleration of the formation of customary 
principles relating to outer space was brought about not only by the fact that all actions of states in the field of 
exploration and use of outer space were immediately known all over the world, but also by the adoption of a number 
of United Nations General Assembly resolutions.”).  It should be noted, however, that the U.N. General Assembly 
has the power only to “make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations.” U.N. Charter, art. X.  In order 
to form the basis of customary international law, such resolutions must purport to state legal principles, enjoy a very 
high degree of consensus, and be reflected in the subsequent general practice of states acting out of a sense of legal 
obligation. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §103 (observing that resolutions of universal 
organizations, “if not controversial and if adopted by consensus or virtual unanimity, are given substantial weight” in 
the identification of international law); §103 Reporters Note 2 (observing that “even a unanimous resolution may be 
questioned when the record shows that those voting for it considered it merely a recommendation or a political 
expression, or that serious consideration was not given to its legal basis.  A resolution is entitled to little weight if it is 
contradicted by state practice…”). 
66 Hinricher, supra note 53, at 499-501 (noting that the ITU is involved “in reshaping and supplementing international 
law” and that “the overall compliance of states with non-binding recommendations issued by international 
organisations such as the ITU can …slowly evolve into binding customary rules and practices.”). 
67 Remuss, supra note 38, at 539; Los Banos, supra note 42, at 100 (arguing that the Code “will lay the groundwork 
to transform commitments into legally binding obligations either through the enactment of a treaty or their 
crystallization into customary international law in the future.”). 
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Each legally significant process and aspect of soft law has been reflected in important 
ways in the development of the legal framework that now governs activities in space.  Soft law is 
thus a long established, vital component of the space law regime and there is an increasing 
tendency of the international community to rely on soft law instruments to assist in numerous 
areas of space activity.68  It should be noted, however, that not all soft law instruments lead to the 
formation of new rules of customary international law or serve as the basis for new legal regimes.  
In some cases, these instruments may be illusory achievements, presenting “only the appearance 
of genuine agreement and shared understanding, when in fact there is none.”69  In addressing arms 
control and security issues, these instruments may also create their own problems, thus causing 
more harm than good (as discussed below).  
 
C.  Soft Law as the Proposed Solution for Space: The Code    
 
In recent years, several diplomatically-driven soft law initiatives related to space activities 
have received considerable attention at the United Nations.  For example, since 2005, the U.N. 
General Assembly has promoted the development and adoption of so-called “Outer Space 
Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures” (TCBMs).70  As part of these efforts, a 
Governmental Group of Experts (GGE) was formed in 2011 with the mandate “to conduct…a 
study on outer space transparency and confidence-building measures” and submit a final report to 
the General Assembly.71  In late 2013, the General Assembly received and endorsed the final 
GGE report and encouraged U.N. Member States to review and implement the proposed soft law 
measures through relevant national mechanisms on a voluntary basis.72  
 
 The EU’s development of an international code of conduct for outer space is not directly 
related to GGE activities,73 although the Code does contain several voluntary TCBMs similar to 
those recommended by the GGE in its final report.  These include provisions encouraging states 
to endeavor to organize the following activities on a voluntary basis: familiarization visits to 
improve understanding of a state's policies and procedures for outer space activities; expert visits 
to space launch sites, flight control centers, and other outer space infrastructure facilities; 
observations of launches of space objects; demonstrations of rocket and other space-related 
                                                 
68 Ferrazzani, supra note 26, at 117 (“Whatever the history of space law may tell, soft law is already there, non-
legally binding but vital, helping significantly in the establishment and development of international space 
relations”); Freeland, supra note 63, at 25-26 (“There is a clear trend towards the use of such [soft law] instruments, 
continuing the long-established understanding that soft law is a well-accepted methodology for 
furthering…endeavors in outer space.”).   
69 RICHARD B. BILDER, MANAGING THE RISKS OF INTERNATIONAL  AGREEMENT 38 38 (1981) (noting how 
commentators have observed that some soft law techniques, such as the employment of equivocal or ambiguous 
language, may result in agreements that are “wholly illusory and not useful.”). 
70 Since 2005, the U.N. General Assembly has annually adopted resolutions promoting TCBMs. These efforts have 
enjoyed the strong support of many governments, particularly the Russian Federation. See Department of Security 
Affairs and Disarmament & Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Russian Approaches towards 
Ensuring Security in Space, in DECODING THE CODE, supra note 29, at 117. 
71 G.A. Res. A/65/68, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/68 (Jan. 13, 2011), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/ 
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/65/68. 
72 Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, G.A. Res. 68/50, U.N. Doc 
A/RES/68/50 (Dec. 10, 2013), available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp? symbol=A/RES/68/50. 
73 Although the General Assembly resolution endorsing the final GGE report explicitly recognized “the presentation 
by the European Union of a draft of a non-legally binding international code of conduct for outer space activities,” 
the Code has proceeded on a sometimes parallel -- but separate – track. Id., at ¶2. 
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technologies; dialogues to clarify information on outer space activities; and, thematic workshops 
and conferences on the exploration and use of outer space.74   
 
The Code, however, contains more than just traditional TCBMs like those recommended 
by the U.N. General Assembly.  The latest draft of the Code is subdivided into four sections (Core 
Principles and Objectives, General Measures, Cooperation Mechanisms, and Organizational 
Aspects) and its stated purpose is “to enhance the safety, security, and sustainability of all outer 
space activities pertaining to space objects, as well as the space environment.”75  To achieve these 
goals, states subscribing to the Code resolve to perform a variety of actions, including notifying 
other subscribing states of designated space activities (without distinction as to their military or 
civilian nature), including pre-notification of the launch of space objects and scheduled 
maneuvers that could pose a risk to the safety of flight of the space objects of other States.76   
 
States further resolve, pursuant to the Code, to annually share information with the other 
subscribing states related to their “space strategies and policies, including those which are 
security-related, in all aspects which could affect the safety, security, and sustainability in outer 
space” as well as their “major outer space research and space applications programmes.”77  Good 
faith efforts to fully implement such provisions on notification and sharing of information may 
raise serious issues for the military agencies of some spacefaring countries, particularly with 
respect to divulging information relating to their sensitive technology and national security.78   
 
Other provisions in the Code, which could be interpreted to restrict specific military 
activities and programs, raise additional national security concerns for some states.  For example, 
the Code contains five different provisions related to a subscribing state’s responsibility to 
prevent “harmful interference” to another state’s space activities and objects, including section 4.1 
in which subscribing states “resolve to establish and implement policies and procedures to 
minimize...any form of harmful interference with another State’s peaceful exploration, and use, of 
outer space.”79  
 
The Code, however, does not define the broad term “harmful interference,” (which could 
encompass diverse types of actions causing direct, indirect, or temporary effects), nor does it 
make any distinction between military and civilian activities that might cause such harmful 
interference.  While the elusive, undefined term harmful interference is found in several 
agreements relating to space, it is used in those agreements in much more limited contexts than as 
a comprehensive prohibition of all forms of harmful interference with space objects.80  
                                                 
74 Id., art. 6.4. 
75 CODE, supra note 31, art. 1.1. Art. 1.2 further provides that “[t]his Code establishes transparency and confidence-
building measures, with the aim of enhancing mutual understanding and trust, helping both to prevent confrontation 
and foster national, regional and global security and stability…” 
76 Id., Sec. 5.1. 
77 Id., Sec. 6.1. 
78 Ajey Lele, Deliberating the Space Code of Conduct, in DECODING THE CODE, supra note 29, at 13, 20 (“No state 
would like to share technical information which could be used to understand, and probe more deeply into, its 
scientific and technological capabilities.”). 
79 CODE, supra note 31, Sec. 2. (¶¶ 25 and 27), 4.1, 6.1 and 7.1. 
80 See, e.g., Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. IX (authorizing a state party to request consultation when there is 
reason to believe that the activity of another state party or its nationals would cause potentially harmful interference 
with activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space); see also David A. Koplow, An Inference About 
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The absence of any definitions of key terms in the Code (including the term harmful 
interference) is recognized even by proponents of the Code as a significant failure.81  Critics of 
the Code (including numerous members of the U.S. Congress) argue that good faith efforts to 
fully implement its broad terms could have far-reaching negative consequences for U.S. military 
and intelligence activities and programs in space.82       
 
Several countries have questioned whether the Code is an appropriate mechanism to 
address the military aspects of outer space, an area which has traditionally been reserved for 
deliberations by the U.N. Conference on Disarmament (the CD) and its Prevention of an Arms 
Race in Outer Space (PAROS) process.83   Russia in particular has sought to distance the proposed 
Code from the PAROS process and has refrained from supporting the Code, preferring instead its 
own proposed legally-binding international agreement (submitted jointly with the government 
People’s Republic of China to the CD), entitled the “Draft Treaty on the Prevention on the 
Placement of Weapons in Outer Space” (the PPWT).84   
 
The relevance of the Code to military activities in space is nonetheless clear, having been 
originally developed, as noted, in response to the 2007 Chinese ASAT test.85  Although the Code 
                                                                                                                                                               
Interference: A Surprising Application of Existing International Law to Inhibit Anti-Satellite Weapons, 35 U. PA. J. 
INT’L L. 737, 781-793, 815 (2014) (cataloguing agreements that contain references to interference and noting in 
particular how various defunct and extant U.S.-Russia bilateral arms control treaties contain provisions that prohibit 
interference with “National Technical Means” or “NTM” spy satellites which are used to verify compliance with 
treaty commitments.)  Although Professor Koplow propounds a thesis that a test or use in space of a debris-creating 
ASAT would be illegal under existing international law because it would result in a dangerous, persistent debris 
stream that would, at some point, “impermissibly interfere with the operation of treaty-protected NTM satellites,” he 
notes that at this time “there are simply not enough treaties containing the explicit NTM provisions to create [on that 
basis alone] a truly comprehensive, global restriction on ASAT activities.” 
81 See Tronchetti, supra note 28, at 361, 377 (while viewing the Code as a step in the right direction, the author notes 
that the absence of any definition of key terms is a “negative aspect” of the Code, one which “may lead to 
uncertainties in the interpretation and application of its provisions.”).  
82 Letter from Thirty-Seven Senators to Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State (Feb. 2, 2011) (on file with author) 
(describing the Code as a “multilateral commitment with a multitude of potential highly damaging implications for 
sensitive military and intelligence programs (current, planned or otherwise…”)). 
83 Mohamed Hatem Elatawy, ICoC: Recommendations for Further Elaboration, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 
32, at 45, 49 (“…a number of countries question the prerogative of this Code to deal with the military aspects of outer 
space, an area that has traditionally been reserved to the CD [Conference on Disarmament].”). Since the CD 
established the Ad Hoc Committee on PAROS (now defunct) in 1985, arms control initiatives have been a regular 
feature of CD discussions, although a common approach regarding a legally binding PAROS instrument has been not 
been achieved. See Paul Meyer, The Conference on Disarmament and the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer 
Space, 6, http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/the-conference-on-disarmament 
-and-the-prevention-of-an-arms-race-in-outer-space-370.pdf.  
84 See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, supra note 70, at 118 (noting how Russia has insisted on 
differentiating between the subject matter and legal basis of the PPWT and Code, and has argued that the drafting of 
the Code “must not undermine our efforts aimed at elaborating the PPWT.”).  The first draft of the PPWT was 
proposed on Feb. 29, 2008.  See Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the 
Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, Conference on Disarmament, CD 1839, Feb. 29, 2008, 
http://www.cfr.org/ content/publications/attachments/PPWT.pdf. The latest draft PPWT was proposed on Sept. 3, 
2015.  See Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force 
against Outer Space Objects, Conference on Disarmament, CD 1985, June 12, 2014, Art. I.b, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/ UNDOC/ GEN/G14/050/ 66/PDF/G1405066.pdf?OpenElement. 
85 Kazuto Suzuki, ICoC and the Right of Self Defense, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 32, at 87, 90 (“…the ICoC 
was developed as a response to the Chinese ASAT test in 2007. The ASAT test created a large cloud of space debris 
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is not stylized as an arms control initiative and does not explicitly prohibit any military 
technologies in space, it nonetheless is designed to be a “comprehensive” proposal which is 
intended “to establish norms of behaviour for all space activities, both in the civilian and military 
domains of outer space.”86  The text of the Code notes “the importance of preventing an arms race 
in outer space” and “the responsibility of States, in the conduct of scientific, civil, commercial 
and military activities, to promote the peaceful exploration and use of outer space for the benefit, 
and in the interest, of humankind and to take all appropriate measures to prevent outer space from 
becoming an arena of conflict.”87   
 
In spite of the limitations of soft law, numerous commentators argue that the Code, as a 
soft law initiative, is the “first step towards addressing the global security concerns caused by our 
increased presence in outer space.”88  A similar, favorable view of a non-binding code of conduct 
for outer space activities is also generally reflected in current U.S. Department of Defense 
policies.  For example, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs noted in 2012 that 
the European Union’s draft plan was “a promising basis for an international code,” and that “[a]n 
international code of conduct can enhance U.S. national security by encouraging responsible 
space behavior by reducing the risk of mishaps, misperceptions and mistrust.”89  
 
Soft law is not, however, a panacea for the problems of space, particularly those related to 
security.  As discussed below, soft law instruments have fundamental limitations in addressing 
security matters, particularly in unstable geopolitical environments, and instead risk increasing 
tensions and undermining meaningful legal constraints.   
 
Part III:  Soft Law: A Problematic Design Choice for Arms Control Initiatives   
 
A. The Challenges of Arms Control  
 
The concept of arms control encompasses a wide variety of measures that rival states may 
undertake to achieve diverse objectives, including: mutually reducing levels of armaments; 
eliminating entire classes of weapon systems; restricting or regulating military activities which 
increase the risk of accidents or conflict; increasing predictability in relations between hostile 
                                                                                                                                                               
that would increase the risk of collision with their space assets. This sort of intentional creation of debris for any 
purpose was unacceptable for many countries.”).   
86 Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan & Daniel A. Porras, Preface to AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 32, at 1 (“The ICoC is 
a comprehensive proposal, trying to establish norms of behaviour for all space activities, both in the civilian and 
military domains of outer space.”); CODE, supra note 31, Preamble, ¶13 (“[r]ecognizing the necessity of a 
comprehensive approach to safety, security, and sustainability in outer space…”). 
87 CODE, supra note 31, Preamble ¶6 and art. 2 (emphasis added). 
88 Beatrice Fihn & Gabriella Irsten, Addressing Challenges in Space through New Multilateral Processes, in 
AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 32, at 119, 120 (further noting that the ICoC is “an example of a recent trend in 
security policies, to move beyond deadlocked forums and traditional framing of problems, to encouraging creative 
thinking and alternative methods of moving forward.”).  
89 Lisa Daniel, Defense, State Agree to Pursue Conduct Code for Outer Space, DOD NEWS, Jan. 18, 2012, 
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=66833; DOD Fact Sheet: International Code of Conduct for Outer 
Space Activities, 2011, DEFENSE.GOV, http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111 
_nsss/docs/DoD%20Fact%20Sheet%20-%20International%20Code%20%208-18-11.pdf (last visited July 13, 2015) 
(stating that “[a]n international Code of Conduct can enhance U.S. national security.”).   
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states; reducing fears about the intentions of potential adversaries, and; pre-empting the 
development or deployment of new types of weapons.90  
 
 Varied bilateral and multilateral instruments which are intended to serve as arms control 
measures between adversary states must, however, overcome many hurdles to be established and 
face severe challenges in functioning effectively.  This is particularly true in the domain of space, 
where conditions encouraging an arms race abound.  Fears, suspicions and accusations about new 
space weapon systems and military space projects continue to multiply, as evidenced particularly 
by the growing concerns expressed by Russia and China on the one hand, and by America on the 
other, about their respective space programs. 
 
Such fears and suspicions can contribute to the classic “security dilemma,” in which 
actions taken by a state intended to be defensive in nature are instead perceived by other states as 
aggressive or threatening, producing unintended and undesired consequences.91  Arms races are 
“only the most obvious manifestation” of the resulting “downward spiral” of these 
misperceptions.92  Predictable and yet unnecessary counter-measures may thus be taken by 
“threatened” states (for example, as U.S. rivals develop their own varied responses to a 
spaceplane like the X-37B), causing further insecurity and fueling more dangerous and expensive 
arms races in space.93  
 
The classic security dilemma is made even more acute in space because a state may feel 
threatened by an adversary’s development and deployment of technologies that are dual-use in 
nature, meaning that they can be readily employed for both civilian and military uses.94  The 
abundance of dual-use technologies in space may thus further obscure an adversary's real 
intentions and make it even more difficult to distinguish between defensive and offensive postures 
(and the possibility that new, devastating military advantages have been achieved).   
 
 In this extremely challenging space environment, one which is characterized by high risk 
and great insecurity, states struggle to achieve arms control agreements and other collaborative 
security measures.  Because the stakes in international politics are typically so high (implicating a 
state’s survival or extinction), the fear of exploitation is likely to motivate a state to follow its 
“dominant strategy,” i.e., cheating or defecting, in the absence of any genuine collaborative 
agreement.95  It is thus not surprising that arms control agreements are “highly institutionalized,” 
with implementing regimes that “are continually concerned with compliance and policing,” and 
“specify verification and monitoring procedures.”96  
                                                 
90 JOZEF GOLDBLAT, ARMS CONTROL: THE NEW GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS 11 (2002). 
91 ROBERT JERVIS, PERCEPTION AND MISPERCEPTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 66 (1976) (further quoting Herbert 
Butterfield as positing that the security dilemma is an “absolute predicament” that “lies in the very geometry of 
human conflict.”). 
92 Id.  
93 Id; US X-37B Spurs China to Seek Countermeasures: Russian Expert, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 
www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id...cid=1101. 
94 JAMES CLAY MOLTZ, CROWDED ORBITS: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN SPACE 12 (2014) (noting that an 
“essential fact” of space technology is “its dual-use nature.”). 
95 ARTHUR A. STEIN, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE: CIRCUMSTANCE AND CHOICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 40 
(1993) (further describing arms control agreements as “notoriously problematic.”). 
96 Id.  
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For example, the START I Treaty97 established an elaborate and effective verification 
regime which allowed the parties to remain confident in each other’s compliance with obligations 
related to the reduction of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles.98   The regime provided 
numerous methods (including mandatory on-site inspections) for the parties to gather and confirm 
needed information about the other party’s treaty-limited forces.99  It also prohibited each party 
from interfering with the other party’s treaty-related surveillance and monitoring capabilities, so-
called “National Technical Means” (principally spy satellites), and established the Joint 
Compliance and Inspection Commission for the discussion of treaty implementation issues and 
compliance questions.100  
 
 While verification, monitoring, compliance and policing activities are routinely associated 
with effective arms control regimes, all these features depend on an even more fundamental, 
underlying attribute: the nature of the commitment.  The nature of commitments in international 
instruments may, however, be dramatically altered by soft law design choices.  
 
A common virtue often attributed to soft law instruments is the ease with which states are 
able to conclude them (compared with the lengthier and more difficult process associated with 
hard law agreements).  In negotiating the design of international instruments, states may consider 
numerous “systemic trade-offs” in substance, structure and obligation.101  The results of these 
trade-offs are different types of instruments which display varying degrees of effectiveness and 
display different levels of difficulty to achieve.   
 
States may choose to employ soft law design elements (such as weakening precision 
and/or obligation) for many reasons.102  In making this choice, however, states may also delay, 
sacrifice or even impede meaningful progress on the issues of mutual concern which are 
addressed in soft law instruments. 
  
                                                 
97 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, U.S.-U.S.S.R., art. III, ¶¶ 9, 6, 4, July 31, 1991, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-20 
(1991). 
98 GOLDBLAT, supra note 90, at 91 (“[The START I Treaty] provided each side with transparency and predictability 
with regard to the strategic nuclear programmes of the other side…”).  See also Allan S. Krass, The People, the Debt 
and Mikhail, 47 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 12, 13 (November 1991) (noting that the verification provisions in 
START I treaty “were elaborate, comprehensive, and intrusive beyond the dreams of even the most idealistic dreamer 
of the 1950s.”). 
99 AMY F. WOOLF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40084, STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AFTER START: ISSUES AND 
OPINIONS 7-9 (March 4, 2010) (noting that the START I Treaty was credited with “institutionaliz[ing] 
unprecedentedly extensive and intrusive measures of verification.”). 
100 Id.  
101 See Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, AM. J. INT’L L 581, 582 (2005) (suggesting 
that legality, substance, and structure can be viewed as "distinct design elements" that should be viewed as a whole in 
evaluating the effectiveness of international agreements).  
102 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 37, at 423 (suggesting that a number of variables, including “transactions costs, 
uncertainty, implications for national sovereignty, divergence of preferences, and power differentials” influence 
which forms of soft law are likely to be selected by states in the particular circumstances that confront them.). 
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B. Soft Law Design Choice:  Weakening Precision 
 
One important soft law design choice in constructing many international instruments is the 
decision to employ vague, imprecise, ambiguous or otherwise indeterminate language.  
Indeterminate language may be a satisfactory design feature for some areas of international 
cooperation, but it is a dangerous choice for arms control regimes.  The requirements typically 
associated with arms control regimes are well known, and one is that they “must define cheating 
quite explicitly.”103 There are fundamental reasons for this requirement. 
 
A state contemplating foregoing the development and deployment of new weapon systems 
in favor of pursuing international cooperation will be reluctant to do so if adversary states are not 
part of a collaborative regime with a degree of formalization.  Such a collaborative regime “must 
specify what constitutes cooperation and what constitutes cheating, and each actor must be 
assured of its ability to spot immediately others’ cheating.”104  The dilemma of common interests 
in this scenario, against the backdrop of perceived security threats, is often modeled in game 
theory as a prisoners’ dilemma in which each state actor’s dominant strategy is to cheat (even if 
all actors would actually prefer arms control or disarmament over a spiraling arms race).105   
 
It is in this context that game theorists and other writers argue that the obligations in an 
arms control regime must be sufficiently precise to ensure that actors can recognize defection.106  
Elaborate monitoring, policing and compliance verification structures in such a regime have little 
value without clear obligations and the ability to recognize cheating.  Precision in individual 
commitments, as well as coherence between those commitments and broader legal principles, 
framed by “accepted modes of legal discourse and argument,” also assist by discouraging states 
from engaging in “auto-interpretation” and other opportunistic behavior regarding their 
obligations.107    
 
The lack of precision in individual commitments, which gives rise to indeterminate 
normative standards, thus makes it harder for states to know what conformity is expected and also 
makes it easier for states to justify noncompliance.108  Conversely, the lack of precision may also 
result in uncertainty and tension as some states attempt to assert highly restrictive interpretations 
of ambiguous terms.  To avoid these problems, especially in the area of arms control, a nation is 
                                                 
103 STEIN, supra note 95, at 40. 
104 Id; see also BILDER, supra note 69, at 117-118 (noting that “prompt detection and clear determination of breach 
are often crucial components of an effective risk-management system designed to prevent cheating.”  Professor 
Bilder further suggests that if a nation is considering violating its own obligations under an agreement, “[i]t will be 
less likely to do so if it realizes that its nonperformance will be readily apparent and clearly labeled as a violation…” 
Conversely, Bilder argues that “if the other nation believes that its obligation is ambiguous or uncertain, it will see 
itself as in a better position to justify or excuse nonperformance or inadequate performance…”). 
105 STEIN, supra note 95, at 40. 
106 See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 140 (1984) (suggesting that recognizing defection 
is an important requirement in promoting cooperation and that the “scope of sustainable cooperation can be expanded 
by any improvements in the players' ability to recognize each other from the past, and to be confident about the prior 
actions that have actually been taken”). 
107 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 37, at 427. 
108 Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 706, 714 (1988) (“Put conversely, 
the more determinate the standard, the more difficult it is to resist the pull of the rule to compliance and to justify 
noncompliance.”). 
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likely to “seek to describe the performance expected of the other nation as clearly and precisely as 
possible in the agreement.”109  Thus, in pursuing major arms control agreements with the Soviet 
Union, the United States “opted for increasingly detailed agreements, on the ground that they 
reduce interpretative leeway.”110 
 
Key undefined terms in the Code, particularly the critical prohibition on “harmful 
interference with space objects,” serve as examples of the difficulties associated with using 
imprecise language to regulate military, intelligence and security activities.  Similarly, provisions 
requiring the exchange of information related to a state’s “major outer space research and space 
applications programmes” are undefined and problematic when broadly applied to these 
activities.111   
 
With respect to efforts to discern the meaning of ambiguous language in instruments like 
the Code, it is also important to note that non-legally binding, political commitments do not 
benefit from the recognized legal modes of discourse that govern the interpretation of terms in 
legally binding international agreements (particularly through the application of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties).112   The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides a 
comprehensive framework of rules for the observance, operation, application and interpretation of 
legally binding agreements, as well as rules governing their conclusion, entry into force, 
amendment, invalidity, termination and suspension.  Specific provisions in the Vienna 
Convention address all aspects of the interpretation of legally binding agreements, including rules 
for determining the meaning of language which remains ambiguous after the application of other 
provisions specifying the context, materials and subsequent practice of the parties to be 
examined.113  No such rules exist under international law for resolving disputes regarding the 
interpretation of ambiguous language in soft law instruments.  
 
The impact of broad and ambiguous terms, particularly on regime compliance by states, 
should not be underemphasized.114  The uncertainties that indeterminate language generates in the 
field of arms control presents its own dangerous risks, since (as discussed above), states rely on 
precise language in arms control agreements for specific purposes and fundamental reasons.  The 
broad and vague language found in the Code, which will be subject to varied interpretations by 
states, may thus “generate more, rather than less, tension in space.”115  
 
                                                 
109 BILDER,  supra note 69, at 118 (further noting, for example, that “the proposed 1979 SALT II Treaty between the 
United States and the Soviet Union contains elaborate provisions attempting to define the obligations of each party in 
the most careful and precise terms.”). 
110 ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 11 (1995) (noting in this regard that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed in 1989 
“is the size of a telephone book.”). 
111 CODE, supra note 31, Sec. 6.1. (requiring Subscribing States to share this information on an annual basis with 
other Subscribing States “where available and appropriate”). 
112 Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, International Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach, 44 VA. J. INT’L 
L.113, 129 (2003). 
113 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 48, articles 31-32. 
114 Chayes & Chayes, supra note 110, at 11 (stating that “ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty language” is one of 
the key circumstances “that lie at the root of much of the behavior that may seem to violate treaty requirements.”). 
115 Jeff Kueter, Rules of the Road in Space: Does a Code of Conduct Improve U.S. Security?, GEORGE C. MARSHALL 
INST., 3-4, (4/01/2011), http://marshall.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/1060.pdf. 
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In contrast to the uncertainty and non-compliance associated with imprecise rules, it is 
argued that “greater clarity conduces to compliance.”116  For example, in reviewing numerous 
agreements with a high degree of specificity, Thomas Franck observed that “the high degree of 
textual determinacy goes together with a high degree of rule-conforming state behavior.”117  
Determinacy in such agreements appears to have its own “compliance pull,” while the absence of 
determinacy in other agreements makes it unlikely that states will have compunctions about non-
compliance.118  Rule-conforming state behavior is thus enhanced by a rule’s determinacy, which 
in turn “depends upon the clarity with which it is able to communicate its intent and to shape that 
intent into a specific situational command.”119   
 
Clear and determinate rules, accompanied by rule-conforming state practice, may 
ultimately give rise to legally binding rules in customary international law and may also lay the 
foundation for legally binding conventions.120  However, the indeterminate language used in the 
Code provides neither clear rules nor a sound basis for developing a legally binding regime.121  
Instead, such language appears to merely mask a failure by states to agree on key terms and 
definitions. It reflects their decision, one that is often made by diplomats in contentious 
negotiations, to paper over their differences in order to achieve what is sometimes referred to as 
“constructive ambiguity.”122  Rather than representing a meaningful meeting of the minds, some 
scholars suggest that such language merely represents a type of “deferred confrontation.”123  In 
the context of arms control, instruments which largely reflect the results of deferred confrontation 
are neither reliable documents on which to build legal regimes, nor do they provide assurances of 
any state’s compliance with regime objectives. 
                                                 
116 Franck, supra note 108, at 721. 
117 Id., at 719 (citing numerous examples of agreements that have a “high degree of specificity” and which are 
“almost invariably obeyed.” These agreements include those establishing rules related to: protecting diplomats; the 
making, interpreting and obligation of treaties; jurisdiction over vessels on the high seas, and in territorial waters and 
ports; jurisdiction over aircraft; copyright and trademarks; international usage of posts; telegraphs, telephones and 
radio waves; rules governing embassy property; rights of passage of naval vessels in peacetime, and; treatment of war 
prisoners.). 
118 Id., at 713, 714 (further noting that “the more determinate the standard, the more difficult it is to resist the pull of 
the rule to compliance and to justify noncompliance”). 
119 Id., at 725. 
120 See, e.g, N. Sea Cont'l Shelf Case (F.R.G./Den., F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 71 (noting that it is possible for 
an article in a convention to be viewed as “norm-creating,” thus constituting the foundation of, or 
generating, a rule “ which, while only conventional or contractual in its origin,” later passes “into the general 
corpus of international law, and is accepted as such by the opinio juris, so as to have  become binding even for 
countries which have never, and do not, become parties to the Convention.” 
121 Id., at 72 (observing in the case of a disputed term in an international convention that the “still unresolved 
controversies as to the exact meaning and scope” of the term “must raise further doubts as to the potentially norm-
creating character of the rule.”).  
122 Orde F. Kittrie, Intellectual Relations: More Process Than Peace: Legitimacy, Compliance, and the Oslo Accords, 
101 MICH. L. REV. 1661, 1670-1671 (2003) (describing constructive ambiguity as “the deliberate use of vague, 
equivocal, or ambiguous language capable of being interpreted by each party as protecting its own interests” and how 
the reliance on this particular methodology as a key element in the Oslo process peace process was 
counterproductive.). 
123 AHARON KLEIMAN, CONSTRUCTIVE AMBIGUITY IN MIDDLE EAST PEACE-MAKING 54-55, 117 (1999) 
(Professor Kleiman further argues that “by leaving core values, issues or interests vague and unsettled,” the use of 
ambiguous language with respect to key issues “is guaranteed to be the source for later difficulties.” In discussing the 
impact of such language on the international community, he also questions how “intentional ambiguity” can be 
“reconciled with calls for transparency, candor and commitment in international relations.”).  
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In an insecure environment in which states confront evolving threats from complex 
military technologies and seek to establish arms control regimes, scholars applying game theory 
suggest that defensive defections from regimes by states may be avoided by relying on both 
verification measures and on a “strategy of assurance.”124  Assurance devices help a state give 
other states confidence in its own cooperation and compliance, with the aim of permitting each 
state party to adhere to the mutually preferred cooperative course of action.125  A state may thus 
provide other states with various types of information about its own compliance as an assurance 
device in arms control scenarios where the benefits of cooperation are great, but the potential for 
cheating is also great and the costs of opportunism and misplaced trust are high.  In this situation, 
“hard legal commitments” can serve as critical assurance devices.126  
 
 The type of commitment that states communicate or signal to each other in an arms 
control regime is fundamentally important.  Commitments made by states and intended as 
assurance devices can only be effective if they are made in a credible fashion.127  Such “credible 
commitments” are crucial in many aspects of contracting theory, game theory and in high-stakes 
arms control scenarios when one party relies on the future performance by others while it 
complies with its own side of the bargain.128  
 
Efforts by states to make credible commitments to other states are fundamentally 
undermined when the legitimacy of those commitments is diminished by textual indeterminacy.129  
A rule cannot be legitimate if it cannot communicate “what conduct is permitted and what 
conduct is out of bounds.”130  Although states may choose to not employ precise terms and take 
an easier, more flexible soft law approach by adopting an instrument containing indeterminate 
language (as in the case of the proposed Code), such indeterminacy has costs which are “paid for 
in the coin of legitimacy.”131 
 
Even when legally binding agreements are employed for arms control and disarmament 
initiatives (as opposed to soft, voluntary, non-binding arrangements), key indeterminate language 
in those agreements can undermine their ability to communicate credible commitments or provide 
                                                 
124 Kenneth W. Abbott, Trust But Verify: The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other 
International Agreements, CORNELL INT’L L. J. 1, 23 (1993).  
125 Id. 
126 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 37, at 429 (noting that “…states should use hard legal commitments as assurance 
devices when the benefits of cooperation are great but the potential for opportunism and its costs are high.”). 
127 Abbot, supra note 124, at 23 (“[w]hat is needed to ensure continued cooperation is a way for each player to 
communicate its ongoing commitment to the cooperative result in a credible fashion.”).  
128 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 37, at 426, 429 (further noting that “…states should use hard legalization to increase 
the credibility of commitments when noncompliance is difficult to detect, as in most arms control situations.”). In the 
event that noncompliance is alleged, legally binding agreements (unlike soft law instruments) are also governed by 
near-universally accepted rules of international law which assist the parties in determining what constitutes a material 
breach and allow any or all of them to suspend or terminate the agreement in accordance with specified conditions. 
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 48, arts. 60, 65.      
129 Franck, supra note 108, at 713, 716 (noting that “[p]erhaps the most self-evident of all characteristics making for 
legitimacy is textual determinacy…[t]he degree of determinacy of a rule directly affects the degree of its perceived 
legitimacy.”) (emphasis added). 
130 Id., at 716 (“To be legitimate, a rule must communicate what conduct is permitted and what conduct is out of 
bounds.”) 
131 THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 53 (1990). 
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security assurances.132  Each state may possess strong incentives for surprise defection from an 
arms control agreement while at the same time risking great damage to its own national security if 
a defection by another state occurs.  In such situations, a state may seek to maintain its own 
flexibility while attempting to ensure that other states are bound by arms limits.133    
 
While soft law may lay the foundation for the development of hard law regimes in other 
fields, in the context of arms control it may instead merely generate new sources of uncertainty 
and conflict.  When indeterminate language is used to establish key rules in arms control 
agreements, no credible commitments are signaled by states.  Concurrently, offensive defections 
may be hard to identify, little assurance is signaled to prevent states from engaging in defensive 
defections, and some states may become “defensive quasi-defectors” as they unilaterally interpret 
(in a self-serving manner) ambiguous key rules.134  
 
C. Soft Law Design Choice: Weakening Obligation 
 
Credible commitments in arms control regimes can be communicated or signaled along 
several “hard” dimensions.  Precision is only one of these dimensions, one which can be 
diminished (as discussed above) by indeterminate language.  The realm of soft law also includes 
international arrangements in which the obligation itself is weakened by an instrument’s reduction 
to a legally non-binding status.  This dimension of soft law relates to the ability of a legitimate 
rule in an agreement to communicate not only content, but also authority.135  Legally binding 
norms thus stimulate a sense of obligation, create a compliance pull, and derive legitimacy not 
only from their form but also from the process whereby these norms are created.136   
 
By entering into legally binding agreements, states can raise the credibility of their 
commitments by staking their “national reputation on adherence” and signaling their intentions 
“with special intensity and gravity.”137  Such commitments serve key functions in arms control 
regimes, making it possible for states to provide assurances to each other to restrain defensive 
defections.  As an “ex ante sorting device,” such hard legal commitments allow genuinely 
committed states to identify themselves as being willing to bear the greater costs imposed on 
violators of binding legal agreements, thus demonstrating a low propensity to defect.138    
                                                 
132 See generally, Jack M. Beard, The Shortcomings of Indeterminacy in Arms Control Regimes: the Case of the 
Biological Weapons Convention, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 271 (2007). 
133 Abram Chayes & Dinah Shelton, Multilateral Arms Control: Commentary, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE: 
THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 521 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) 
[hereinafter COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE]. 
134 Beard, supra note 132, at 289 (noting that states with the most advanced technology can become “quasi-defectors” 
by exploiting the soft limits of indeterminate restrictions “through sophisticated auto-interpretation of a regime's 
scientific and technical requirements…”). 
135 Franck, supra note 108, at 725 (noting that “…the legitimacy of the rule—Its ability to exert pull to compliance 
and to command voluntary obedience— is to be examined in the light of its ability to communicate. In this instance, 
however [relating to the symbolic validation, ritual and pedigree of the rule], what is to be communicated is not so 
much content as authority.”). 
136 Chayes & Shelton, supra note 133, at 526-27 (further arguing that “some evidence in arms control cases supports 
this view, suggesting that a norm in a treaty may induce more conforming state behavior than one that is purely non-
binding.”). 
137 Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal? 45 INT’L ORG. 495, 508, 511 (1991) (further 
noting that states use treaties to “underscore the durability and significance of the underlying promises.”). 
138 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 37, at 429. 
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 One aspect of many types of legally binding agreements that has special significance for 
signaling a credible commitment and communicating authority is the formal ratification or other 
approval of such agreements by the legislative body of a state.  Each country determines its own 
internal procedures for expressing its consent to be legally bound by international agreements, 
including what role (if any) is assigned to the national legislative body of that country.  While the 
words “treaty” and “international agreement” are synonymous terms for legally binding 
agreements as a matter of international law,139 in the United States the word “treaty” has a 
narrower meaning which usually refers to only those legally binding international agreements 
which require the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate.140   
 
The process of legislative approval in the United States can also be accomplished by 
“congressional-executive agreements,” i.e., agreements authorized in advance or subsequently 
approved by a majority vote of each house of Congress.141  The president may also enter into 
“sole executive agreements,” i.e., agreements made pursuant to the President’s constitutional 
authority without further congressional authorization.142  The U.S. Supreme Court has 
consistently recognized the validity of properly concluded, legally binding “executive 
agreements.” 143  In practice, however, such findings may be aided or supported by the implied 
approval of Congress.144   
 
Whether a treaty or executive agreement is employed, both types of agreements result in 
binding obligations for the United States under international law, with concurrent credibility and 
assurance benefits for purposes of arms control regimes.  Both approaches should be 
distinguished, however, from the proposed Code, which will not constitute a legally binding 
agreement.  While non-binding arrangements are often closely associated only with the 
                                                 
139 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 48, art.2, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. Although the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, it recognizes its substantive provisions as 
generally representing customary international law. See, e.g., Fujitsu Ltd. v. Federal Exp. Corp., 247 F.3d 423 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (“we rely upon the Vienna Convention here as an authoritative guide to the customary international law of 
treaties ...”).    
140 U.S. CONST. art. II, §2 (providing that the President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.”). 
141 MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33539, INTERNATIONAL LAW AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT 
UPON U.S. LAW 4-5 (2015), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32528.pdf, (noting also that “the great 
majority of international agreements that the United States enters into are not treaties but executive agreements…”). 
142 Id. 
143 See, e.g., United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (“an international compact ... is not always a treaty 
which requires the participation of the Senate”); American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (“our 
cases have recognized that the President has authority to make ‘executive agreements’ with other countries, requiring 
no ratification by the Senate...this power having been exercised since the early years of the Republic”); see also, 
LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 175 (1996)  (“Whatever their theoretical merits, it is 
now widely accepted that the Congressional-Executive agreement is available for wide use, even general use, and is a 
complete alternative to a treaty... ”). 
144 See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 227-228 (1942) (while upholding the validity of the executive 
agreement at issue (the “Litvinov Assignment”) and noting that it was “part and parcel” of the President’s new policy 
of recognizing the Soviet Union under his constitutionally enumerated powers to “receive ambassadors,” the Court 
also noted that it was part of his efforts to alleviate the effects of Soviet nationalization of U.S. assets and that 
“Congress tacitly recognized that policy” through the authorization of the appointment of a Commissioner to 
determine the claims of American nationals against the Soviet government.).  
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government in power at the time such arrangements are signed, legally binding agreements ensure 
that states remain bound by the principle of pacta sunt servanda so that even if new governments 
come to power, they “must perform the obligations entered into by a previous regime.”145   
 
In assessing the types of instruments that states may employ to make international 
commitments, it is widely acknowledged that “the treaty regime makes the government’s 
commitment more credible.”146  Similarly, other types of legally binding agreements which 
involve legislative approval, such as Congressional-Executive Agreements found in the U.S. legal 
system, involve credible commitments similar to those signaled in the treaty-making process.  In 
general, countries with more difficult treaty-making processes tend to employ those processes less 
frequently (and thus conclude fewer treaties), but the commitments in those treaties are more 
credible because “the cost of legislative involvement itself communicates information about the 
probabilities of compliance.”147  Furthermore, in light of the power that legislatures have in 
democracies to frustrate the implementation of international agreements, the structures and 
processes of treaty-making (involving institutionalized legislative participation) have often been 
used as a signal to communicate and reinforce the credibility of commitments to foreign 
countries.148   
 
 The executive leader of a state may also choose to utilize the legislative consent process in 
making an international commitment in order to send a more credible signal about that leader’s 
degree of commitment to the treaty.149  Because legislatures have the ability to prevent the 
implementation of agreements through the democratic process, other states may have doubts 
about the ability of the executive branch to actually fulfill a commitment without legislative 
approval or acquiescence.150  Just as indeterminacy undermines credible commitments with costs 
paid in legitimacy, the advantages of non-legal arrangements (easier and quicker negotiation, etc.) 
come with costs paid in “a reduction of the information and commitment benefits that flow from 
                                                 
145 Tom Ginsburg, Locking in Democracy: Constitutions, Commitment, and International Law, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 
& POL. 707, 736 (2006) (further noting that “the relevant unit of analysis in international law is the state, not the 
government.”). 
146 Id., at 725.  
147 Id., at 743, 749 (further noting that “[i]f treaty commitments are too easy to enter into, they may not…facilitate 
credible signals on the international plane.”). 
148 Jeffrey Frieden & Lisa L. Martin, International Political Economy: Global and Domestic Interactions, in 
POLITICAL SCIENCE: STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 118, 124 (Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner eds., 2002) (further 
noting that “agreements negotiated without legislative participation may lack credibility….Evidence drawn from the 
United States and the EU demonstrates that the credibility of commitments rises with institutionalized legislative 
participation.”).  
149 Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 112, at 126-127 (further noting that “an executive wishing to foster successful 
international cooperation wil1, all things being equal, choose a treaty with a domestic ratification process that 
includes legislative participation….Legislative participation sends a credible signal about the seriousness with which 
the president views the treaty.”). 
150 Ginsburg, supra note 145, at 13 (further noting that “[l]egislative involvement in treaty making communicates 
information to other states as to which type of agreements will be enforced by the state and which will not. They are 
thus commitment-enhancing.”).  Furthermore, states may be concerned about the validity of agreements which are 
concluded in the face of internal legislative opposition since an agreement may be invalid if the state’s consent is 
expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law (provided that the violation was manifest and concerned a rule 
of its internal law that was of fundamental importance relating to its competence to conclude the agreement.)  See 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 48, art. 46. 
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legislative participation…”151  
 
 For their part, the legislatures of liberal democracies may view some matters as so serious 
and involving such high stakes that they see legislative participation as necessary to convey the 
most formal, legally binding and credible commitment to foreign states (with the expectation of 
receiving a similar, formal, reciprocal commitment from that foreign state).  Arms control matters 
clearly raise such concerns in the United States.  For example, Congress enacted a law in 1961 
which continues to provide that “[n]o action shall be taken pursuant to this chapter or any other 
Act that would obligate the United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the 
United States in a militarily significant manner, except pursuant to the treaty-making power of the 
President set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution or unless authorized by the 
enactment of further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States.”152    
 
Regardless of the manner in which they are approved or ratified, legally binding 
international agreements possess various benefits of legalization that further contribute to 
signaling a credible commitment.153  In spite of the perceived advantages of non-legally binding 
political instruments, they lack these benefits of legalization. 
 
Unlike the political content of non-binding documents, legalization in international 
agreements can perform a “channeling function” by conveying the seriousness of a state’s intent 
to be bound, signaling at the outset a lower probability of future violations (than would be present 
without legalization).154  As discussed above, legal rules are also perceived as having their own 
compliance pull, are less inclined to be diminished by auto-interpretation, and benefit from “a 
special set of expectations about how the agreement will be interpreted, understood, and 
enforced” by virtue of the existence of a formal law of treaties as codified in the Vienna 
Convention.155   
 
In the case of arms control agreements, “hard legalization,” i.e., the strengthening of such 
instruments across the dimensions of both precision and obligation, increases the credibility of 
commitments and serves a particularly key function when detection of non-compliance in some 
                                                 
151 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 94 (2005) (further noting that non-
legal instruments are generally less costly, less public, and can be negotiated and concluded more quickly than legal 
agreements, but that these advantages “all come at the price of a reduction of the information and commitment 
benefits that flow from legislative participation…”). 
152 22 U.S.C. § 2573(b).  This section was amended in 1994 by Public law No. 103-236. (This statute now 
complicates the signing of the ICoC by the United States, as discussed below in Part IV.C. below.)  The specific 
requirement in this statute for a treaty or an authorization “by the enactment of further affirmative legislation” 
appears to eliminate any actions, instruments or processes involving only the implied approval of Congress. 
153 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 37, at 428 (noting that, at the outset, “[l]egal obligations are widely perceived as 
having particular legitimacy.”). 
154 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 151, at 98. 
155 Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 112, at 129 (observing that an important difference between treaties and non-
legal instruments is the role of the formal law of treaties in the Vienna Convention, and that by becoming a party to a 
treaty, a state “provokes a special set of expectations about how the agreement will be interpreted, understood, and 
enforced.  A non-legal agreement does not create the same expectations, because technically the Vienna Convention 
does not govern such agreements”); Abbot & Snidal, supra note 37, at 429 (“Legalization entails a special form of 
discourse, requiring justification and persuasion in terms of applicable rules and pertinent facts, and emphasizing 
factors such as text, precedents, analogies, and practice.”). 
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arms control regimes is hard to detect.156  The Code possesses none of these hard law attributes or 
advantages.  The vague provisions of the Code also do not provide a basis for successfully 
generating new, legally binding rules of customary international law that would be useful for an 
arms control regime (or any other regime).157  
 
Legalization plays an important and beneficial role in many areas of international 
cooperation and serves a particularly crucial function in the insecure environment of military 
competition and arms control.  It is thus not surprising that even commentators who support the 
Code nonetheless admit that a hard law approach is the “first and best choice” for regulating the 
subject matter to be addressed by the Code.158 Along similar lines, a debate continues among 
space law experts over the question of whether the Code is a distraction from more meaningful 
international efforts to conclude legally binding agreements to govern critical space activities.159   
 
Many proponents of the Code suggest that even if the negotiation and conclusion of a 
legally binding agreement would clearly be preferable to a soft law approach, in the interim a soft 
law instrument would positively contribute to the management of the outer space environment.160   
Yet, as discussed above, soft law instruments such as the proposed Code are particularly 
ineffective mechanisms in the high-stakes arena of arms control and may instead burden states 
with a new set of uncertainties, thus risking greater insecurity and more tension in the volatile 
domain of space – while also making the development of new hard law rules for space activities 
less, not more, likely.161 
 
D.  Soft Law, Arms Control, and the Democracy Disadvantage 
 
 Although proponents of soft law point to the benefits and advantages of soft law, these 
benefits and advantages may not fall evenly on all states undertaking arms control commitments 
in soft law instruments.  Soft law instruments do not contain legally binding obligations, but they 
can and often do convey political commitments by states.  As voluntary, political undertakings, 
such documents permit all participating states the same opportunity to follow or not follow 
established principles without violating any legal obligations.  The practical and political impact, 
                                                 
156 Abbott & Snidal, supra note 37, at 429 (further noting that even when legal arrangements that include centralized 
or decentralized monitoring provisions are absent, “legal commitments compensate in part for the reduced likelihood 
of detection by increasing the costs of detected violations.”).  
157 See, e.g., N. Sea Cont'l Shelf Case, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42, 44 (While a clear rule in an international a document may 
serve as the basis for the formation of a binding obligation or norm under customary international law, the court 
found that “the very considerable, still unresolved controversies as to the exact meaning and scope” of the rule at 
issue raised doubts as to “the potentially norm-creating character of the rule.”).  
 
158 See, e.g., L.I. Juqian, Mission Completed and Mission Ahead: ICoC to the Future, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra 
note 32, at 37, 43 (“…to cope with the challenge of space activities, a well-recognised and concluded treaty, the ‘hard 
law,’ is the best and first choice.”);  Arvind Gupta, Forward to DECODING THE CODE, supra note 29, at ix, x (arguing 
that since a legally binding agreement is difficult to achieve, a voluntary code of conduct is “the next best option.”). 
159 See, e.g., Elatawy, supra note 83, at 49. 
160 Id., at 46. 
161 Instruments employing ambiguous language may significantly reduce the chance of states reaching a binding 
agreement since they may “relax the pressure on the parties to reach an agreement capable of really dealing with the 
problem involved, induce false public expectations, and, when these expectations are disappointed, lead to increased 
conflict and more difficulty in reaching real agreement.”  BILDER, supra note 69, at 1703-1704. 
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however, on liberal democracies that stray (or appear to stray) from such principles may be much 
different than the consequences for non-liberal or authoritarian regimes that engage in similar 
behavior.  
 
The term “liberal democracy” can be defined in many ways, denoting among other things 
a state with a representative government, constitutional guarantees of civil and political rights, 
and a functioning judicial system dedicated to the rule of law.162  Of particular importance for 
purposes here is the guarantee of civil and political rights that assures individuals, the media and 
private interest groups the opportunity to interact in “civil society” free of undue interference 
from State organs.163 
 
Even scholars from states with an authoritarian history and non-liberal traditions candidly 
observe that a commitment to a non-binding space code of conduct (that expresses nothing more 
than a joint declaration of intent) can carry more weight in democratic nations, “where military 
programs and financing are transparent, and where military agencies and the military-industrial 
complex are monitored by independent parliaments and civilian groups.”164   
 
Without similar societal conditions and monitoring by democratic institutions and 
independent media organizations, authoritarian leaders may thus feel free to breach any code they 
might sign, “as long as their violations remain hidden from the world community.”165  Even in the 
case of legally binding agreements, any form of “societal verification” of disarmament and arms 
control treaties is possible “only in democracies tolerating transparency in military affairs, open 
discussion of security issues and unhampered activities of the mass media.”166  Since soft law 
instruments like the Code do not benefit from verification regimes, enforcement mechanisms, 
legally binding dispute resolution procedures or even agreed standards of interpretation, they 
depend entirely on self-enforcement by subscribing states and whatever societal verification is 
present in those states.    
 
The argument here is not that liberal and non-liberal states clearly display different levels 
of compliance with respect to their international legal obligations, although some scholars have 
suggested (somewhat controversially) that such distinctions can be made.167  Rather, the argument 
                                                 
162 Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EURO. J. INT’L L. 503, 511 (1995); 
Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AF. 205, 206-09 (1986) (defining 
liberal democracies as having four major characteristics: (1) protection of private property; (2) a market economy; (3) 
equality under the law and respect for human rights; and (4) a representative government deriving its authority from 
the consent of individuals.).  
163 Slaughter, supra note 162, at 511. 
164 See, e.g., Alexi Arbatov & Vladimir Dvorkin, Conclusion, in OUTER SPACE: WEAPONS, DIPLOMACY, AND 
SECURITY 103, 108 (Alexei Arbatov & Vladimir Dvorkin eds., 2010).  It should be noted, however, that in spite of 
any relative advantages Russia might gain over the United States in subscribing to the non-binding Code, the Russian 
government has refused to support the Code if it interferes with its higher-priority: securing the adoption of its 
proposed PPWT agreement (jointly proposed with China).  See supra note 84 and accompanying text.   
165 Id. 
166 GOLDBLAT, supra note 90, at 133.   
167 See, e.g., Charles A. Kupchan & Clifford A. Kupchan, Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe, 16 
INT’L SEC. 114, 115-16 (1991) ("[Sltates willing to submit to the rule of law and civil society domestically are more 
likely to submit to their analogues internationally."); Slaughter, supra note 162, at  503, 511 (noting that “behavioural 
distinctions between liberal democracies and other kinds of States, or more generally between liberal and non-liberal 
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is that non-binding international instruments may be scrutinized very differently in liberal 
democracies than they are in authoritarian states, particularly in states where a hospitable 
environment is provided for private interest groups to freely investigate, evaluate and criticize 
government military programs and assess whether they are consistent with the spirit of 
international commitments.168  
 
The preference of authoritarian states for non-binding instruments is not, however, an 
absolute one. For example, in some cases, authoritarian regimes may prefer a more advantageous 
legally binding agreement that clearly restricts their adversaries’ more sophisticated technology 
while permitting the continuing deployment of their own less sophisticated but still effective 
weapon systems (as seen in the case of China and Russia’s current support of the proposed PPWT 
over the Code.)169   
 
 In other cases, military activities which are able to be observed by the entire international 
community (particularly in space) may result in unwanted attention and pressure from the 
international community, leading authoritarian states to eschew soft law arrangements, legally 
binding agreements or any other instruments that have the potential to restrict their military 
activities in space.170  However, in areas such as weapons research and development – where 
authoritarian societies can ensure that secrecy will be more effectively maintained and that 
criticism by independent actors in their societies will be far less likely – soft law arms control 
arrangements may present clearer advantages over rival democratic states.  
 
 While authoritarian states may be able to pursue space-related military activities, 
especially space weapons research and development (R&D) programs, with a relative lack of 
scrutiny under a non-binding code, liberal democracies may face serious obstacles in pursuing 
similar activities that relate to military programs involving potentially restricted offensive 
capabilities.  For this reason, some commentators argue that an instrument like the Code, even 
though it is a non-binding instrument, could “exert de facto influence on U.S. space programs.”171   
                                                                                                                                                               
States, cannot be accommodated within the framework of classical international law.”); but see, Jose Alvarez, Do 
Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter’s Liberal Theory, 12 EURO. J. INT’L L, 183, 210 (2001) (“…we 
still have little reason to confident that the level of compliance across the range of subjects of covered by 
international obligations falls along ‘liberal/non-liberal’ lines.”).  
168 Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 
YALE L. J. 273, 369 (1997) (“…liberal democracies are likely to provide a more hospitable environment for courts 
and private actors whose interests align with the promotion of a supranational rule of law and who have the freedom 
to pursue those interests.”). 
169 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.  
170 See, e.g., Samson, infra note 228, at 138 (noting that “several major space powers”, including the United States, 
have generally resisted any potential restraints on their space capabilities and that some countries “have not even 
developed official national space policies because they do not want limits placed on how they utilize space in the 
future.”).  Regarding current U.S. policy, however, the Obama Administration has indicated a willingness to consider 
arms control treaties or other arrangements that would limit the development of space weapons while promoting 
space operations that are “conducted in ways that emphasize openness and transparency.” See William Broad & 
Kenneth Chang, Obama Reverses Bush’s Space Policy, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2010, A19. On the other hand, China 
has been described by space experts as being “allergic to transparency measures.” Michael Krepon, Norm Setting for 
Outer Space, SPACE NEWS, Sept. 8, 2014, http://spacenews.com/41789norm-setting-for-outer-space/. 
171 See, e.g., Kueter, supra note 115, at 5 (arguing that it “would be difficult to foresee” the United States initiating a 
specific military program associated with conduct prohibited by the ICoC “and avoiding being criticized sharply for 
failing to live up to the spirit of the Code, even though those actions are allowed.”).    
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R&D activities with ambiguous or multiple goals related to future military activities in 
space may be viewed with considerable suspicion by interested observers in legislatures and 
among members of a state’s civil society, particularly if those activities are seen as being 
inconsistent with the spirit or terms of international commitments.  Arms control regimes that 
affect the future military capabilities of the most powerful states generally entail predictions by 
those states about future technological developments.172  Acting on these predictions may be 
complicated in democracies where governments face public scrutiny in their selection and funding 
of technological alternatives related to future military missions.173   
 
Classified U.S military space R&D programs, including current projects like the X-37B, 
continue to be the subject of media attention, analysis and speculation in the United States, but 
they do not face restrictions or broad public opposition based on their violation of U.S. laws or 
international obligations.  Thus, within the framework of existing laws and international 
obligations, U.S. military planners and researchers have considerable flexibility to pursue diverse 
military projects associated with current and future security requirements and goals in space.  
 
Predicting future military missions and associated technological requirements are perilous 
undertakings for governments in any area of national security, and none may be more challenging 
as predicting future threats and programs in the vast and complex realm of outer space.174  For 
this reason it is not surprising that some members of the U.S. Congress have sharply criticized the 
Code based on the “unknown consequences” that indefinite limitations under that document could 
have on “future military or intelligence programs.”175   
 
A soft law instrument with broad and vague objectives that restricts future military 
activities may thus serve to effectively limit some technological options available to participating 
democratic states (if those states make good faith efforts to fully comply and respect the spirit and 
letter of the commitments made in those instruments.)  Such concerns are reflected in the views of 
some critics who argue that the Code would disadvantage the United States by impeding advances 
in space technology because those advances are also likely to be labelled as “military” in nature 
and inconsistent with the goal of preventing an “arms race” in space.176  
 
Successful military operations in outer space remain highly dependent on advanced 
technology.  For this reason, U.S. space policies have long emphasized that “to achieve national 
security objectives and compete successfully internationally, the U.S. must maintain technological 
                                                 
172 COLIN S. GRAY, HOUSE OF CARDS: WHY ARMS CONTROL MUST FAIL 43 (1992). 
173 Id. (noting that “[a]rms Control, which entails a greater or lesser measure of technology prediction, typically has 
the effect for democracies of constraining the range of choice among possible solutions to problems that are left 
unaddressed or underaddressed.”). 
174 Letter from Rep. Michael Turner, Chairman, Subcomm. on Strategic Forces, H. Armed Services Comm. et al., to 
President Barack Obama (Jan. 18, 2012) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter from Rep. Michael Turner et al.] 
(“… no one can know today what programs the United States may need to undertake in outer space in the future for 
its military and intelligence national security requirements.”). 
175 Id.  
176 See, e.g., John R. Bolton & John C. Yoo, Opinion, Hands Off the Heavens, N.Y. TIMES, March 8, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/opinion/hands-off-the-heavens.html?_r=0; See also CODE, supra note 31, 
Preamble, ¶6 (noting “the importance of preventing an arms race in outer space.”). 
30 
 
leadership in space.”177   Recent U.S. space policy statements reaffirm that the United States must 
continue to “pursue, adapt, and evolve the unique technologies, innovative exploitation 
techniques, and diverse applications that give the United States its strategic advantage in 
space.”178 
 
Since a state’s judgment of its military strength and security is inherently relativistic, 
international competition in national security matters is more like a race than an effort to achieve 
any specific standard or goal.179  Important technological innovations fundamentally change the 
nature of this race as they may allow a state “to get a competitive jump on its rivals.”180  
Technological innovations with military implications by one state may thus inspire great 
insecurity in other states, particularly as they relate to activities in outer space.181   
 
For a liberal democracy involved in national security-related “competition” in space, 
efforts to achieve and maintain technological superiority may present special challenges.  Broad 
R&D initiatives related to new space technologies with military applications are likely to be 
scrutinized by legislatures, the media and domestic interest groups and may raise suspicions that 
new offensive space capabilities are under development.  Currently, such suspicions are not 
invoked in support of campaigns or significant protests against the U.S. government for violating 
any international commitments in space.  If, however, the United States subscribes to the Code, 
this scrutiny would have a new focus. 
 
The continuing revision of official drafts of the Code indicates that new U.S. space 
military capabilities, even if they are described as being “defensive” in nature, are likely to be 
heavily scrutinized and criticized if the United States adopts the Code.  For example, although an 
earlier 2010 draft of the Code explicitly provided that “a comprehensive approach to safety and 
security in outer space should be guided by … due consideration for the legitimate defence 
interests of States,” that clause was omitted in the 2013 revised draft because it “was seen as 
particularly troublesome by many states given that it could be interpreted subjectively, favoring 
certain states to potentially weaponize their space capabilities.”182  
 
Even the basic reference to the inherent right of states to individual and collective self-
defense in the current draft of the Code is problematic for some states since they view such a 
provision as a “back door” to “legitimising weaponisation of outer space.”183  While a clause 
explicitly ensuring the fundamental right of self-defense is an essential requirement for the United 
States in any code of conduct for space activities, countries which view U.S. space programs with 
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178 National Security Space Strategy, supra note 11, at 7. 
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suspicion continue to fear that such a provision “opens the possibilities to increase the use of 
force, weapons and the militarisation of the outer space arena.”184 
 
The fears that states clearly harbor regarding the militarization and weaponization of space 
(and related suspicions regarding U.S. space programs) seem likely to generate controversy over 
the interpretation by the United States of key terms in any future version of the Code to which the 
United States subscribes.  Similar interpretations and related new military space programs and 
research activities may be pursued without difficulty in authoritarian states, but would be subject 
to great scrutiny by private interest groups, the media and the Congress in the United States.   
 
The potential public scrutiny of U.S. compliance with Code provisions has led some 
conservative critics in the United States to argue that, even though it is a non-binding instrument, 
the Code could effectively impede a variety of U.S. military space programs and a host of 
technology improvements that may have military or intelligence applications to space.185  While 
some of these fears may be overstated, they nonetheless represent concerns that are present only 
in a liberal democracy or a state in which military programs and financing are relatively 
transparent, and where military agencies and defense industries are monitored by independent 
legislatures, media, and civil society groups. 
   
Part IV: The Code as a Problematic Soft Law Variant  
       
 The Problem of “Soft Law on Soft Law”                                   
 
Since the subject matter of the proposed Code clearly involves issues of common concern 
to all states, it might appear at first glance to be a document that could be easily embraced by the 
international community.  States have not, however, acted with any sense of urgency in approving 
the proposed Code, which has been under consideration since 2008.  This lack of enthusiasm may 
be attributed in part to the fact that the proposed Code is not the first soft law instrument to 
address the subject matter at issue.  In fact, efforts to promote the Code raise serious questions 
about the effectiveness of duplicative soft law approaches to key problems in space and about the 
wisdom of imposing one type of soft law framework on top of another, different, existing type of 
soft law.  This is particularly true as it relates to addressing the most pressing issue now 
confronting the international community in space: the problem of orbital space debris.     
 
The proposed Code represents a particular type of soft law, one which is developed at a 
high level by the diplomats of states and international organizations. While such “top-down 
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diplomatic approaches” can make significant contributions to collaborative activities in space, 
another approach to soft law focuses on the technical work of specialized governmental agencies 
and on “bottom-up best practices developed and demonstrated by commercial operators, academic 
institutions, and other technical experts.”186   
 
Bottom-up, non-binding best practices and similar initiatives are typified by approaching 
space topics “from an applied technical perspective focusing on solving problems facing those 
working and operating in the space field.”187  In contrast to what is sometimes referred to as the 
“top-down diplomatic approach,” this bottom-up approach allows specific technical issues to be 
addressed in detail by individuals drawn from the community of technical experts who are “best 
qualified to address the specifics” and who represent industry, non-governmental organizations, 
and the specialized governmental agencies of the interested parties.188   
 
The most successful and widely recognized example of the bottom-up, non-binding, best 
practices approach in space is the collaborative development of international space debris 
mitigation guidelines by the Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee (IADC).189  The IADC 
consists of the representatives of the European Space Agency and the space agencies of the 
twelve most active space nations who exchange information on space debris research activities, 
cooperate on space debris research, and identify debris mitigation options.190  Drawing on 
NASA’s 1995 Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (the world’s first such guidelines), the 
IADC developed a set of technical guidelines for minimizing the creation of space debris, the 
IADC Debris Mitigation Guidelines (the “IADC Guidelines”), and submitted them to the U.N. 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UN COPUOS) in 2002.191  The IADC 
Guidelines served as the basis for the UN COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines (UN 
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COPUOS Guidelines) which were adopted in 2007 and later endorsed by the U.N. General 
Assembly.192   
 
Although the IADC and subsequent UN COPUOS Guidelines are non-binding, they have 
had an important and legally significant impact on the national regulatory frameworks of many 
countries.193  In the United States, these debris mitigation practices have been implemented for 
government-sponsored space missions through directives and instructions of NASA and DoD and 
for commercial space operations through the regulations and procedures of the Federal 
Communications Commission, and the Departments of Commerce and Transportation.194  The 
cumulative effect of numerous countries and their national agencies implementing such 
regulations is an increasingly more harmonized approach in national legal frameworks to the 
critical issue of space debris generation.  Although these practical, bottom-up, technical-based 
debris mitigation standards originated in a soft law instrument, there is nonetheless a reasonable 
chance that they will evolve into “a generally accepted state of art which no actual or potential 
actor in space can afford to ignore.”195  
 
While each country’s debris mitigation standards and regulations vary, their fundamental 
principles and objectives – as established in the IADC Guidelines – are the same: “(1) Preventing 
on-orbit break-ups; (2) Removing spacecraft and orbital stages that have reached the end of their 
mission operations from the useful densely populated orbit regions, and (4) limiting the objects 
released during normal operations.”196  These objectives are achieved through requirements and 
standards which address: objects released intentionally and unintentionally during mission 
operations; fragments caused by on-obit breakups (including on-orbit collisions, accidental break-
ups, and intentional destruction of objects); and, break-ups after mission termination.197 
 
The IADC Guidelines, and the UN COPUOS Guidelines that they inspired, have made a 
widely recognized, significant contribution to preserving the outer space environment and 
numerous states have codified debris mitigation standards into their national regulatory 
frameworks.198  Citing the success of collaborative, technical, bottom-up debris mitigation efforts, 
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Debris: The Growing Threat to Space Operations, http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs. 
nasa.gov/20100004498.pdf. 
195 I. Marboe & F. Hafner, Brief Overview over National Authorization Mechanisms in Implementation of the UN 
International Space Treaties, in NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION IN EUROPE: ISSUES OF AUTHORISATION OF PRIVATE 
SPACE ACTIVITIES IN THE LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPEAN SPACE COOPERATION 29, 70-71 (Frans G. von der 
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from the launch phase, through mission phase, to the end-of-mission disposal phase (in which spacecraft or orbital 
stages are maneuvered into positions or situations so as to not to cause interference with active spacecraft or orbital 
stages.). 
197 Id. 
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critics of the proposed Code suggest that a top-down, diplomatically-driven multilateral code is 
“not needed to spur international dialogue on issues important to space operations.”199  In 
addition, unlike the defined technical objectives and agreed processes that have served as a solid 
foundation for IADC efforts, critics note that states subscribing to the Code are guided only by 
statements of principles with no accompanying indication of how those principles are to be 
recognized or practically implemented. 200 
 
A diplomatically driven, top-down form of soft law being imposed on a technical, bottom-
up version also raises the prospect of confusion and potential conflict between different 
frameworks attempting to regulate the same subject matter.  With multiple frameworks seeking to 
establish the same type of operational space guidelines, some experts question whether any clarity 
that has or can be achieved in this area “will soon become over-complicated by a plethora of 
‘how-to’ efforts...”201   
 
Differences in the nature of the entities responsible for top-down and bottom-up initiatives 
in space may further complicate the practical application of technical rules and standards in space.  
In contrast to technical guidelines developed first at the working level, top-down, diplomatically 
driven initiatives are generally sponsored by international organizations (such as various U.N. 
institutions) with high-level officials representing many states and operating by consensus – thus 
giving rise to fears voiced by some experts that there is a “substantial risk that politics may 
overtake practical substance” in this area.202    
 
Conflicting interpretations of different guidelines which are applied to the same subject 
matter in space, yet are generated by contrasting soft law approaches, may have highly negative 
consequences.  If the statements of principles in the proposed Code are nothing more than a 
reaffirmation of existing principles and an endorsement of the standards already developed by the 
IADC, it is hard to see much value in the great effort expended to date on their adoption.  If, on 
the other hand, the proposed Code is intended to create new norms (as its proponents suggest), 
there is a risk of disputes arising from conflicting interpretations of these different soft law 
frameworks, resulting in an even less stable security environment in space.203 
                                                                                                                                                               
Space_Debris Compendium_COPUOS_2014-full.pdf.   
199 See, e.g., Kueter, supra note 115, at 5 (further posing the question that if the IADC Guidelines and similar efforts 
“are judged insufficient by Code proponents, what additional steps do they favor?”). 
200 Id., at 3-4 (arguing that without defined objectives, processes or a technical framework to rely on, states 
subscribing to the Code essentially “buy into a process whose outcomes remain undefined.”).  
201 See, e.g., Baseley-Walker, supra note 187, at 115 (noting also that it is a matter of “some concern” how various 
sets of best practices established by different groups, including the IADC and a COPUOS Working Group of Experts, 
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clause in the latest draft of the Code which attempts to affirm that subscribing states are acting “without prejudice to 
ongoing and future work in other appropriate international fora relevant to the peaceful exploration and use of outer 
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202 Id., at 115-116 (observing that while the IADC submits its proposals to the UN for approval and is thus “dual 
track, with one foot inside the UN and one outside,” some other groups, such as the COPUOS Working Group of 
Experts, are more engaged in the UN system from the outset, thus elevating the risk of politics overtaking practical 
substance.). 
203 Kueter, supra note 115, at 4 (“The ICoC is just a shell…conflicting interpretations will lead to confusion when 
disputes inevitably arise and could result in an even less transparent and less stable security environment in space.”). 
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 If any soft law mechanism is to be employed in improving the security of space objects 
(particularly to address the problem of orbital debris), there is a strong argument to be made for 
bottom-up, technically-based guidelines as a means of developing at least some types of 
significant rules-based behavior.204  Such technical guidelines enhancing the security of space 
operations are historically not the results of top-down diplomatic efforts, but instead are drawn 
from the “existing operational experience of the principal actors, commercial operators and 
government agencies.”205  It is this community of actors, and not the “space diplomatic corps in 
Vienna,” that some commentators argue is the “proper source for the emergence of a normative, 
behavior-oriented regime.”206 
 
  Two other major goals of the proposed Code – improving space safety and space traffic 
management (STM) – are fundamentally linked to the problem of space debris and appear to also 
be best addressed, and to some extent are already being addressed, by bottom-up, technical 
collaboration instead of top-down, diplomatic initiatives.207  International air traffic controls may 
perhaps be cited as a precedent or analogy for this approach, since those controls emerged only 
after many years of working-level efforts involving airlines, pilots, airports, technicians and 
various governmental agencies responsible for aviation matters.208   
 
 With respect to initial, inter-agency efforts to address space traffic management issues, the 
U.S. Strategic Command has in recent years entered into “Space Situational Awareness” (SSA) 
sharing agreements with 41 commercial firms and five nations in order to develop routine 
operational space partnerships and improved international data sharing.209  These SSA 
Agreements are described as laying the foundation for increased international cooperation, and 
are further aided by efforts to integrate partner nation sensors into the U.S. Space Surveillance 
Network.210  Expanded operational working relationships in this area continue to be encouraged 
by the U.S. Government, particularly by the U.S. Defense Department, in order to “improve the 
                                                 
204 Gerard Brachet, Peace in Space: Building on the Outer Space Treaty, in CELEBRATING THE SPACE AGE: 50 YEARS 
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207 STM and space safety are subjects are subjects dominated by the problem of space debris. See, 
Marshall H. Kaplan, An Integrated Approach to Orbital Debris Research and Management, SPACE TRAFFIC 
MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE 6 (Nov. 6, 2014), available at http://commons.erau.edu/cgi/ 
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209 Space Traffic Management: How to Prevent a Real Life “Gravity”: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Space of the 
H. Comm. on Sci., Space, and Tech., 105th Cong. 1 (statement of Lt. Gen. John “Jay” Raymond) (noting that in 2014 
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210 Id. (further noting that the first such sensor -- the Canadian Sapphire satellite -- was recently incorporated and that 
work is underway to place a US Space surveillance telescope and radar in Australia.). 
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quantity and quality of the SSA information it obtains and expand provision of safety of flight 
services to U.S. Government agencies, other nations, and commercial firms.”211  
 
There are also private efforts involving operational data exchanges aimed at ensuring the 
“safety and integrity of satellite operations” through “controlled, reliable and efficient sharing of 
data.”212  The Space Data Association, a private limited liability non-profit, has developed the 
Space Data Center (SDC), which is described as a “secure, reliable completely automated 
analytical information system,” in order to address “conjunction analysis and [radio-frequency 
interference.]”213  The SDC has been programmed so as to allow members of the Space Data 
Association to share “real-time critical operational data essential to the better protection of their 
respective satellite fleets and management of the overall earth orbit environment.”214  This private 
initiative at reducing satellite collisions is recognized as “the way forward” alongside the IADC 
Debris Mitigation Guidelines.215 
 
Unlike fledgling public and private efforts to advance STM and space safety issues, debris 
mitigation measures have achieved a significant level of development and sophistication over 
many years under the auspices of the IADC.  While the impact of the IADC Guidelines is 
significant, major issues related to orbital space debris remain to be addressed by the international 
community, including remediation problems and certain critical activities (notably the intentional 
destruction of objects in space as part of hit-to-kill ASAT weapons testing) that produce 
unusually large and dangerous amounts of debris.216  Because these problems are linked to 
important and sensitive arms control and security issues in space, they lie beyond the competence 
of a set of voluntary, technical best practices or the competence of any other soft law 
instrument.217  The intentional destruction of a space object by China (in its debris-generating 
ASAT test in January, 2007) clearly demonstrates this point, since the non-binding IADC 
Guidelines then in effect (which China had subscribed to) called upon states to avoid the 
                                                 
211 National Security Space Strategy, supra note 11, at 6 (further stating that “[s]hared awareness of spaceflight 
activity must improve in order to foster global spaceflight safety and help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and 
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213 Richard DalBellow & Michael Mendelson, Private Risk Management in Orbital Operations: Inter-operator 
Liability and the Space Data Association 8, available at www.intelsatgeneral.com/wp-
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214 Id., at 8-9. 
215 JOSEPH N. PELTON, SPACE DEBRIS AND OTHER THREATS FROM OUTER SPACE 34 (2013). 
216 See, David Wright, Orbital Debris Produced by Kinetic-Energy Anti-Satellite Weapons, in CELEBRATING THE 
SPACE AGE, supra note 204, at 155 (noting that “[s]pace debris can pose a long-term threat to the future use of outer 
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(ASAT) weapons… since there is currently no effective way to remove large amounts of debris from orbit, 
controlling its production is essential for preserving the long-term use of space.”). 
 217 See Viikari, supra, note 191, at 744 (noting how the IADC Guidelines, and the COPUOS Space Debris 
Mitigation Guidelines that they inspired, fail to address the problem of ASAT testing.).  
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“intentional destruction of a space system (self-destruction, intentional collision etc.) and other 
harmful activities that may significantly increase collision risks to other systems…”218   
 
It is thus not surprising that although the IADC Guidelines (and the national laws and 
regulations implementing those guidelines) have contributed to improving the regulation of space 
debris, some commentators suggest that non-binding mechanisms like the Guidelines might not 
represent “the optimal solution in the long run,” especially if the goal is to effectively regulate all 
actors in space.219  Instead, they correctly argue that the time has come for states to instead agree 
on legally binding measures for regulating the prevention and management of space debris.220   
 
To the extent that soft law can play a valuable role in mitigating space debris, it appears to 
be best employed in bottom-up initiatives based on the successful model of the IADC Guidelines.  
A new type of soft law placed on top of these existing efforts cannot accomplish what a new 
legally binding agreement can achieve, particularly in the context of volatile space arms control 
and security issues.  On the contrary, such a top-down, diplomatically-driven soft law approach 
risks causing confusion, conflict and greater insecurity in space while at the same time 
diminishing the existing legal and administrative framework governing activities in space. 
 
B. The Problem of “Fractional Soft Law”   
  
Even though the first draft of the proposed Code was introduced over seven years ago, 
wide-spread acceptance of the document by states has been understandably difficult to achieve; as 
of the most recent meeting of 109 states discussing the adoption of the Code (in September 2015), 
there is still no timetable for its finalization.221  The proposed Code continues to enjoy support 
from only a fraction of the international community.  Although some significant space-faring 
countries, including members of the European Union, Japan, Canada, and Australia, have 
expressed varying degrees of support for the proposed Code, opposition continues to be expected 
from other major space powers, particularly Russia and China.222   
 
Opposition to the proposed Code from the Russian and Chinese governments appears to 
be motivated primarily by the continuing concern of these major space powers that efforts to 
promote the Code could undermine the adoption of their preferred, jointly proposed and legally 
binding PPWT agreement.223 While the PPWT requires states-parties “not to place any weapons 
                                                 
218 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, Committee on the 
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in outer space,” it controversially excludes any restrictions on terrestrially-based ASAT weapons 
(which the United States describes as “the most pressing, existing threat to outer space 
systems.”)224  For this and other reasons, including the lack of any verification regime, the United 
States has rejected the PPWT for failing to meet its standards for consideration of space arms 
control proposals, namely that they “must be equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the 
national security of the United States and its allies.”225  To this point in time, however, the 
benefits and relative advantages that Russia and China perceive in continuing to promote the 
legally binding PPWT (which the United States does not hesitate to describe as an inequitable and 
flawed agreement) appear to outweigh any interest in subscribing to the Code.  
 
The Russian and Chinese governments are currently joined by other states (e.g., Brazil, 
India and South Africa) in expressing a preference for some form of legally binding agreement 
over the Code.226  Numerous states, including significant space stakeholders such as India and 
Brazil, have also frequently expressed serious concerns about the Euro-centric process adopted by 
the European Union to advance the Code.227  Indeed, the failure of the European Union to include 
non-EU states (other than the United States) in the early stages of developing the Code has been 
strongly criticized and continues to cast doubts on prospects for the instrument’s wider 
acceptance.228  (This concern recently led many states to request that future discussions of Code 
be moved to a truly multilateral forum, preferably the U.N. General Assembly.229)  Several 
emerging space powers have also expressed concern about signing the proposed Code because of 
“possible constraints applied to nascent space programmes,” a concern which forms part of a 
larger criticism that international opinion on activities in space is too much a by-product of the 
strategies of the main space powers.230   
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Although the United States had originally expressed tentative support for the proposed 
code, on January 17, 2012, the U.S. State Department issued a statement announcing that “[t]he 
European Union’s draft Code of Conduct is a good foundation for the development of a non-
legally binding International Code of Conduct.”231   While emphasizing that the United States 
would join with the European Union and other states to develop a code of conduct for outer space 
activities, Secretary of State Clinton declared that “we will not enter into a code of conduct that in 
any way constrains our national security-related activities in space or our ability to protect the 
United States and our allies.”232  To this point, however, the United States has not offered any 
proposed alternative to the Code.233   
 
 Notwithstanding the U.S. government’s reluctance to sign the current draft of the 
proposed Code, senior U.S. officials argue that a code of conduct for space could enhance US 
national security by “serving as one of the most visible and political ways in which nations 
commit to acting responsibly in space” and that “[n]ations willfully acting contrary to a code 
could expect to be isolated as rogue actors.”234  Yet these same officials also concede that it is 
only by “establishing widely accepted guidelines for responsible behavior in space” that the 
national security of the United States and its allies will be enhanced.235   
 
A similar official position found in a U.S. Department of Defense press release notes that  
“[a] widely-subscribed Code can encourage responsible space behavior and single out those who 
act otherwise, while reducing risk of misunderstanding and misconduct.”236  Another DoD fact 
sheet notes that it is a “broadly-accepted set of international norms of responsible behavior” that 
can be expected to have “a positive effect on deterrence” and “help the international community 
identify and isolate aggressors.”237   
 
Thus, according to U.S. Department of Defense policy, only a “widely-subscribed” and 
“broadly-accepted” code (that presumably includes major space-faring powers like Russia and 
China) could hope to identify and isolate states that act contrary to its rules (notwithstanding the 
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need for such rules to also be part of a clear, legally binding and credible commitment by the 
states involved, as discussed above).  Although the Russian and Chinese governments could view 
the non-binding Code as providing some relative compliance advantages over the United States 
(as discussed in Part 3.D., above), they are unlikely to subscribe to the Code if doing so in any 
way interferes with their continuing efforts to promote their higher priority -- and to them, more 
advantageous -- legally binding PPWT agreement.238   
 
Russia and China thus continue to lie beyond the reach of the Code, defeating efforts by 
proponents to make the Code a widely subscribed and broadly accepted instrument and greatly 
diminishing its purported “norm-setting” capabilities.  Whatever benefits soft law instruments are 
asserted to have in addressing security matters, participation by only a fraction of states in the 
Code, particularly a fraction that fails to include all the major space-faring countries, will not 
provide a sound basis for establishing new norms or help to identify or isolate aggressors and 
other non-participating, misbehaving states.  Furthermore, states facing perceived security threats 
in space are not likely to be assured by a fractional version of the Code in which their potential 
adversaries do not even participate.  
  
In some areas of international cooperation, such as the protection of human rights, 
persuading only a fraction of states to initially sign multilateral instruments may be viewed as a 
positive, progressive step of achievement (particularly since human rights agreements are not 
focused on reciprocal obligations).239  As an arms control initiative for space, however, the 
Code’s failure to include Russia and China and other major space stakeholders is a fundamental 
flaw.  The absence of powerful, potential adversaries makes multilateral conventions addressing 
arms control or disarmament issues highly problematic for those states contemplating joining 
such regimes and making potentially dangerous, non-reciprocal commitments.240  To the extent 
that soft law arrangements such as the proposed Code seek to promote arms control measures in 
the face of severe security dilemmas and the threat of arms races, the non-participation of 
powerful adversaries clearly undermines such efforts.  
 
If the proposed Code is adopted by states in its current state of limited acceptance, a 
fractional soft law product will emerge which will present its own particular disadvantages and 
problems (beyond those associated with soft law arrangements generally).  Not only would a 
fractionalized Code fail to identify aggressors and isolate rogue states, it could instead lead to de 
facto competing legal regimes in space, as subscribing states respect their own “rules of the road” 
while other non-participating states – especially major, non-participating space powers – seek to 
advance their own interests through different or less restrictive approaches.  Attempts to later 
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successfully persuade non-participating states to accede to the Code will be challenging, if not 
impossible, and could risk further weakening rather than improving the code.241    
 
Still another casualty of a fractionalized Code would be any attempt to establish new and 
meaningful transparency and confidence building measures through the sharing of information.  
Information serves a central function in the Code since subscribing states resolve to share 
information on a wide variety of topics, notably regarding “their space strategies and policies, 
including those which are security-related, in all aspects which could affect the safety, security, 
and sustainability of current and planned activities in outer space” as well as “their major outer 
space research and space applications programmes.”242       
 
Space law generally seeks to maintain a focus on the free and open sharing of information 
for the benefit and safety of all nations.243  The Code, however, contains restrictive information-
sharing provisions requiring subscribing states to share information only with other subscribing 
states.244  This restrictive information sharing arrangement, which was not part of the first draft of 
the Code in 2008, appears to reflect the insecurity of would-be subscribing states as they now 
contemplate the likelihood of fractional state participation in the Code and the possibility of 
sharing potentially sensitive information with numerous non-subscribing states on a non-
reciprocal basis. This restrictive information arrangement defeats the larger purposes of the Code 
(“enhancing the safety, security, and sustainability of outer space activities”245 ) since even 
information relating to potentially dangerous activities which threaten all space-faring states are 
not required under the Code to be distributed to the international community as a whole.   
 
The absence of key state actors in the information sharing process significantly undermines 
the ability of the Code to bring genuine transparency to space activities.  Furthermore, the 
voluntary nature of the process does nothing to ensure the accuracy or completeness of the 
information that is submitted, especially since subscribing states are unlikely to voluntarily submit 
many types of sensitive space data related to important scientific and technological capabilities.246  
The obvious failings of this mechanism have prompted harsh criticism, with one commentator 
noting that “[t]he basic purpose behind the CoC gets defeated if insufficient, inaccurate and 
irregular information is provided by states.”247  The incomplete and voluntary information 
disclosure process also fundamentally undercuts the hoped-for ability of the proposed Code to 
help identify “bad sheep.”248   
 
                                                 
241 See Kueter, supra note 115, at 7-8 (noting that if non-participating states are dissatisfied with the ICoC, they “can 
be expected to demand concessions, both formal and informal…to secure their signature on the Code.”). 
242 CODE, supra note 31, sec. 6.1.  
243 See Space Law, U.N. OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/FAQ/splawfaq. html 
(noting that in order to achieve its primary goals, space law addresses a variety of diverse matters, including “sharing 
of information about potential dangers in outer space.”). 
244 CODE, supra note 31, sec. 6.1 (“The Subscribing States resolve to share, on an annual basis, where available and 
appropriate, information with the other Subscribing States…”).  
245 Id., Preamble, ¶10. 
246 Lele, supra note 78, at 20 (“No state would like to share technical information which could be used to understand, 
and probe more deeply into, its scientific and technological capabilities.”). 
247 Id., at 19. 
248 Id., at 20 (“Undertaking confidence-building measures through a series of voluntary disclosures is likely to have 
limited utility and would not help identify the ‘bad sheep’…”). 
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There are few, if any, examples of non-binding, multilateral codes being used to address 
significant arms control issues.  This lack of state practice is itself a compelling indication of the 
unsuitability of soft law instruments in this area.  However, in defending the President’s authority 
to sign non-binding documents related to security matters, the U.S. State Department has cited the 
2002 Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (the HCoC)249 as a good 
example of a “similarly non-binding code.”250  Upon closer inspection, however, not only is the 
HCoC unlike the Code in important respects (and unlike other instruments addressing problems 
posed by weapons of mass destruction), it is better cited as an example of the failure of non-
binding instruments to successfully address security matters – particularly when those instruments 
exclude numerous significant state actors.251 
 
At the outset, it should be noted that the HCoC constitutes a much more limited attempt than 
the Code to address international security matters and does not present states like the United 
States with any new arms control-type constraints.252  As noted by one congressman during 
hearings related to the funding of national security space activities, the HCoC imposed no 
restraints on U.S. military operations while, in contrast, an Executive Summary of the Joint Staff 
Operations assessment of the proposed Code stated that “[i]f the United States were to make a 
good-faith effort at implementing the requirements of the draft code, there could be operation[al] 
impacts on U.S. military space operations in several areas.”253 
 
Furthermore, unlike the broad scope and objectives of the Code, the HCoC attempts only to 
make modest inroads in restricting the proliferation of one specific weapon system (ballistic 
missiles).  In addition, the very limited commitments that states undertake when they subscribe to 
                                                 
249 The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (the HCoC), U.N. Doc. A/57/724, 3.c., (Nov. 
25, 2002), available at http://www.hcoc.at/?tab=what_is_ hcoc&page=text_of_the_hcoc [hereinafter HCoC]. 
250 Hearing on Nat’l Def. Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 and Oversight of Previously Authorized Programs 
Before the Subcomm. on Strategic Forces of the H. Comm. on Armed Services, 112th Cong. 87 (2013), app., (Letter 
from Hon. David S. Adams, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of State, to Chairman 
Turner (March 8, 2012), available at https://fas.org/irp/congress/2012_hr/space.pdf [hereinafter HEARING ON 2013 
NDAA]. 
251 See Camille Grand, The Hague Code of Conduct: 10 Years of Combating Ballistic Proliferation, 74 NON-
PROLIFERATION MONTHLY 1 (Special Issue 2013), available at www.cesim.fr/documents/onp/eng/74pdf (noting that 
“[the HCoC’s] limits are well publicized; as a non-legally binding instrument, it forbids neither the possession, 
production, nor the development of ballistic missiles and does not impose any onerous constraints on possessor 
States.  As such, it is not comparable with the major international conventions that deal with weapons of mass 
destruction.”); A Brief Overview of Norms Development in Outer Space, supra note 59, at 6 (noting that the utility of 
the HCoC framework has been criticized “because of…the absence of several key states from the list of 
signatories.”). 
252 The different nature and purposes of the HCoC and the Code were highlighted during hearings in the U.S. 
Congress.  In sharply criticizing Administration efforts to compare the HCoC with the Code, the Chairman of the 
Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the U.S. House Armed Services Committee asked “…what was it that the U.S. was 
doing in 2002 that it no longer did as a result of subscription to The Hague Code? Were we proliferating ballistic 
missiles before the code?” HEARING ON 2013 NDAA supra note 250, at 18. 
253 Congressman Michael Turner, HEARING ON 2013 NDAA supra note 250, at 18 (In further contrasting the impact 
of the HCoC with the Code, Congressman Turner asked “What impact on U.S. military and intelligence operations 
was there from The Hague Code of Conduct? What binding regulations were issued on the Department of Defense 
and IC as a result of U.S. subscription to The Hague Code…?”). 
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the HCoC are phrased in even weaker and more ambiguous terms than those contained in the 
Code.254   
 
Notwithstanding the limited scope and other shortcomings of the HCoC, its ability to have 
any meaningful impact has been significantly further diminished by its fractional subscription.  It 
is particularly handicapped since “the majority of Asian countries that contribute to the challenge 
of missile proliferation remain outside the mechanism.”255  The lack of many significant actors in 
the HCoC regime, or in any other fractional soft law regime that attempts to address security 
matters, fundamentally undermines any credibility it may have as an international security tool.256  
Thus, in the absence of some mechanism to ensure the inclusion of the key actors in the Code, it 
has been argued that the Code “is likely to see a repeat of the experience with the HCoC in which 
most Asian countries of proliferation concern have chosen to remain outside the mechanism.”257 
 
The HCoC is thus an instructive example regarding soft law instruments, but not a positive 
one.  As noted by one commentator, its limitations as a fractionalized soft law instrument are self-
evident, as it appears to have done very little to limit the spread of ballistic missile technology.258  
With many key states refusing to subscribe to the HCoC and many signatory states failing to 
implement it, the HCoC underlines the limited value of so-called “norms” in non-legally binding 
documents in which “there is no obligation created and thus there is potentially a higher chance 
for weak adherence.”259  
                                                 
254 For example, compare Principle 3.c of the HCoC (which requires the subscribing states “to exercise maximum 
possible restraint in the development, testing and deployment of Ballistic Missiles…including, where possible to 
reduce national holdings of such missiles…”), HCoC, supra note 249, at 3.c, (emphasis added), to ICoC provisions 
which address “outer space activities involving all space objects launched into Earth orbit or beyond” and requires 
subscribing states to “refrain from any action which brings about, directly or indirectly, damage, or destruction, of 
space objects unless such action is justified” and “to limit, to the greatest extent practicable, any activities in the 
conduct of the routine space operations.” CODE, supra note 31, at 1.2, 4.2, 4.3 (emphasis added).   
255 Grand, supra note 251, at 1 (noting how “[in] Asia and the Middle East, adherence to the Code is more the 
exception than the rule.  Brazil, China, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and Syria are all yet to sign…”). 
256 Lucia Marta, The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation: “Lessons Learned” for the 
European Union Draft Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities, EUR. SPACE POL’Y INST. (2010), 
http://www.nonproliferation.eu/web/documents/other/luciamarta 4ebbdee13df4d .pdf  (noting that the lack of 
participation by significant countries in the HCoC ,including North Korea, Iran, China , emerging actors in the space 
sector like Brazil, Mexico and Saudi Arabia, and most other middle eastern and south Asian countries – “undermines 
the credibility of the Code not only in terms of its universalization and the potential to create an international 
customary law, but also in terms of its credibility as an international security tool.”). 
257 Timothy Farnsworth, U.S. Backs Efforts to Draft Space Code, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, https://www.arms 
control.org/act/2012_03/US_Backs_Efforts_to_Draft_Space_Code; Micah Zenko, A Code of Conduct for Outer 
Space, Council on Foreign Relations (2011), http://breaking defense. com/2013/07/landmark-space-policy-shift-as-
china-others-agrees-to-talk-about-space-code-of-conduct/ (“Along current trend lines, the EU code will likely suffer 
the same fate as the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, which was endorsed by 132 
states, but not Brazil, China, or India, much less Iran and North Korea.). 
258 Kueter, supra note 188, at 4 (noting that the HCoC has “done little to slow the spread of ballistic missile 
technology. The utility of the ballistic missile as a warfighting instrument is such that nations either have elected to 
stay outside the regime or ignore it.”). 
259 A Brief Overview of Norms Development in Outer Space, supra note 59, at 7 (noting how the failure of signatory 
states to implement the HCoC “underlines the extent of the reach of such types of norms as, in that they are non-
legally binding documents, there is no obligation created and thus there is potentially a higher chance for weak 
adherence.”); Lele, supra note 78 at 5, 6 (“In reality, mechanisms like HCoC or the proposed space CoC have 
extremely limited relevance and actually serve no purpose beyond offering a ‘feel good’ notion.  It would be naïve to 
think to think that states actually care for such non-binding mechanisms.”). 
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   In light of the issues discussed above, it is not surprising that many advocates of the Code 
stress the crucial need for all interested nations, particularly all major space stakeholders, to sign 
the Code in order for it to have any chance of success.260  Without the participation of these states, 
the proposed Code is doomed to become part of an unusual class of particularly ineffective soft 
law instruments.  Furthermore, in the case of arms control measures, potential dangers lurk for 
states like the United States that choose to subscribe to such fractionalized soft law instruments 
and attempt to comply in good faith with their restrictions.  
 
   C. “Non-Binding Norm-Creating” and the Democracy Deficit 
  
One suggested advantage of soft law instruments over hard law is that they are easier for 
states to negotiate and conclude while retaining the ability to later serve as the possible basis for 
legally binding obligations.  This advantage flows from the capacity of soft law instruments to be 
both “non-binding” and “norm-creating.” Yet soft law’s non-binding and norm-creating qualities 
may pose a dilemma for the legislatures of democratic states, as illustrated by the unfolding 
controversy in the United States over the possible adoption of the proposed Code.  At first glance 
it may seem surprising that a state’s legislative body would be concerned about a legally non-
binding instrument, but such a document takes on new significance when a state’s executive 
unilaterally (without involving the legislature) proclaims that the adopted instrument will be 
promoted by that state as a basis for creating new binding rules of customary international law. 
    
1. The Code Controversy Within the U.S. Government 
 
In contrast to the space policies of previous administrations, the Obama Administration 
has expressed a desire to promote new types of collaborative activities in space and a willingness 
to consider proposals for space-related arms control agreements (albeit with significant 
caveats.)261  It has also indicated a willingness to consider a variety of new soft law mechanisms 
for outer space, including those which contribute to the development of what it described as 
“norms of behavior for responsible space operations.”262   
 
                                                 
260 See, e.g., Stefan A. Kaiser, Why States should Sign the Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities?, in DECODING 
THE CODE, supra note 29, at 88, 90 (“…there is one crucial prerequisite for the success of the code of conduct.  It 
needs to reflect a broad consensus among the space-faring nations. All major space-faring nations need to sign.”); 
Elatawy, supra note 83, at 50 (noting in order for a code such as the ICoC to beneficial, it must, among other things, 
be “negotiated widely among all states in a proper multilateral venue.”); Samson, supra note 228, at 139 (arguing 
that, at a minimum, “what is needed is the agreement of key space stakeholders that the guidelines set down in a code 
of conduct are for the best.”). 
261 Broad & Chang, supra note 170, at A19 (noting that the new National Security Space Strategy states that 
Washington will “consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively 
verifiable and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies.”). 
262 National Security Space Strategy, supra note 11, at 5; National Space Law Policy of the United States, at 2, 7 
(June 28, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf 
(stating that “[t]he United States will support development of data standards, best practices, transparency and 
confidence-building measures, and norms of behavior for responsible space operations.”). 
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Consistent with its new space policies, the U.S. government expressed tentative support in 
2009 for the proposed Code, subject to its formulation as a legally non-binding instrument. 263   
Stressing the power of soft, non-binding instruments to build norms, a fact sheet released by DoD 
in 2011 noted that “[t]he United States is working closely with the European Union on a draft 
international Code of Conduct, which could serve as an important first set of norms of responsible 
behavior.”264   
 
On February 2, 2011, thirty-seven members of the U.S. Senate expressed significant 
concerns about the proposed Code in a letter to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.265  On January 
17, 2012, the State Department announced that the United States would not sign on to the EU’s 
current draft of a proposed Code, but that it would nonetheless “join with the European Union and 
other space-faring countries to develop an international code of conduct for outer space 
activities.”266  
 
While several ranking members of U.S. Congress indicated in a letter to President Obama 
of January 18, 2012, that they applauded the decision to not sign the current version of the draft 
Code because it presented “significant policy and operational concerns,” they also expressed 
grave reservations about the proposed use by the Executive Branch of a non-binding soft law 
mechanism to promote possible restrictions on US military and intelligence capabilities and 
space.267  Of particular importance for purposes of this article, the congressmen questioned the 
appropriateness of the Code’s non-binding, norm-creating approach as applied to arms control in 
space.  They argued that the Code, if adopted, could be used “as a starting point” for the 
negotiation of an international arms control agreement, and further suggested that it could 
“establish the foundation for a future arms control regime that binds the United States without 
the approval of Congress.”268  Such a legally binding impact on the United States could 
presumably take place through the codification of Code provisions in future international 
conventions (although this would require congressional involvement in order to be internally 
binding on the United States) and/or their transformation through state practice into rules of 
customary international law which would be binding on all states.  
 
Furthermore, the perceived advantage of non-binding instruments to harmonize 
international standards by generating uniform domestic legal requirements was directly criticized 
by the congressmen, who noted that although the Administration argued that the draft Code would 
be “non-binding and voluntary, the implementing regulations surely would be binding.”269 
 
                                                 
263 Bill Gertz, New Space-Arms Control Initiative Draws Concern, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2012 (quoting a Dec. 9, 
2009, State Department cable expressing concern about the use of legally binding language in the draft EU Code.). 
264 Supra note 236.  
265 Letter from Senators to Hillary Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State (Feb. 2, 2011) (on file with author).  
266 Supra note 255. 
267 Letter from Rep. Michael Turner et al, supra note 174. 
268 Id. (arguing that this approach “would bypass the established constitutional processes by which the United 
States becomes bound by international law.”). 
269 Id. (further arguing that “[b]ecoming a signatory on this type of a Code of Conduct without Congressional 
approval appears intended to implement international policy with which the Congress has not expressed 
concurrence or approval.  It appears that the Department of Defense and possibly the Intelligence Community 
would have to issue departmental implementation regulations that would impact both our national and economic 
security.”). 
46 
 
Writing in response to the Congressman on behalf of the President, a senior State 
Department official noted that the Code “would not be a treaty or international agreement that 
would impose legal obligations on the United States” and that it was not “a legally-binding arms 
control agreement.”270  While this is an accurate statement, it is also a narrow one that does not 
speak to the possibility that the Code could generate legally binding domestic regulations, serve 
as the basis for future legally binding agreements, or give rise to new legally binding norms of 
customary international law.  
 
In response to concerns expressed by some members of Congress that the proposed Code 
represented “arms control by the back door,” administration officials did not dispute that the 
substance of the draft Code related to arms control issues, only that it was not “arms control” 
because the Code itself is “not legally binding.”271  Nevertheless, some members of Congress 
argued that this process could result in legally binding obligations and related policies being 
approved without their input and outside the normal process for considering and approving 
congressional-executive agreements or ratifying treaties.272   
 
While the Obama Administration has correctly emphasized that the proposed Code is not a 
proposed international agreement and is thus not subject to the procedural and substantive rules 
governing the consideration, authorization and conclusion of international agreements, the 
potentially legally binding impact of the Code through its contribution to the formation of 
customary international law is another matter. 273  In that regard, the executive’s unilateral 
adoption of such a soft law instrument would leave the legislative branch in a poor position to 
affect what it views as an objectionable step by the United States in leading the way in the 
potential development of new rules of customary international law that could restrict U.S. military 
capabilities and operations in space.   
 
As noted above, arms control measures (defined by the U.S. Congress as any action that 
“would obligate the United States to reduce or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United 
States in a militarily significant manner”) are the subject of a special statutory regime (requiring 
such obligations to be made pursuant to the treaty-making power or with affirmative legislation 
by the Congress).274  Questions regarding the applicability of this statutory regime have escalated 
the conflict between the U.S. legislative and executive branches over the proposed Code.275  The 
result was the enactment in 2014 of an unprecedented piece of legislation entitled “Limitation on 
International Agreements Concerning Outer Space Activities,” found in Section 913 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (“Section 913.”)276   
                                                 
270 HEARING ON 2013 NDAA, supra note 250 (Letter from David S. Adams, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Legislative Affairs, to Michael Turner, Chairman). 
271 Schulte & Schaffer, supra note 43, at 14 (“One concern [that we have heard about the code] is, is this arms control 
by the back door? This is not arms control. I mean, this is a voluntary code. It is not legally binding.”). 
272 Letter from Rep. Michael Turner et al., supra note 174.  
273 See 1 U.S. Code § 112b (the “Case-Zablocki Act”), which imposes regulations only on those documents which are 
legally binding international agreements (including the requirement that the document be transmitted to Congress). 
274 22 U.S. Code § 2573(b). 
275 See Jack M. Beard, Soft Law as an Impediment to the Regulation of Space Activities with Military Implications: A 
View from the United States Congress, 65th INTERNATIONAL ASTRONAUTICAL CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS, 10570, 
10578-10580 (2014).  
276 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No. 112-239, 126 Stat. 1632 (2013), codified at 
51 U.S.C. § 30701, Note (2013) [hereinafter the 2013 NDAA]. The President had previously threatened to veto the 
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Not surprisingly, Section 913 reaffirmed the requirement that any obligation to reduce or 
limit the armed forces or armaments of the United States in outer space in a militarily significant 
manner be accomplished only pursuant to a treaty or specific statutory authorization.277  However, 
Section 913 also broke new ground by establishing several onerous certification requirements, 
one of which may cast a long shadow over America’s ability to continue to play a leading role in 
helping to form rules of customary international law for outer space.  In particular, Section 
913(a)(1) contains unusual criteria which appear to prevent soft law instruments like the Code 
from serving as a basis for both future international agreements and rules of customary 
international law.   
 
Among other things, Section 913(a)(1) requires the President to submit to appropriate 
congressional committees a certification that “such agreement has no legally-binding effect or 
basis for limiting the activities of the United States in outer space.”278  In reluctantly signing the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, President Obama issued a statement 
indicating that certain provisions in this Act, including Section 913, “could interfere with my 
constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States.”279   
 
 The legal significance, if any, of presidential signing statements in this context is hotly 
contested.280  A full examination, however, of the constitutional status of presidential signing 
statements, related separation of powers issues, and the capacity of the President to lawfully 
engage in a wide spectrum of executive acts related to international affairs is beyond the scope of 
this paper.  However, other issues arising from the divided and conflicted participation of the 
American democracy (or any other democracy) in the formation of customary international law 
deserve special attention here, particularly as they relate to the adoption of a soft law instrument 
on the basis of its non-binding yet norm-creating character.  
 
2.  The Code, “Norm-Creating,” and the Formation of Customary International Law 
 
Repeated statements by U.S. officials that the proposed Code entails no legal obligations 
because it is not a legally binding agreement unfortunately speak to only one dimension of the 
                                                                                                                                                               
Act based on the unacceptable way Section 913 and other provisions in the bill impeded the President’s ability to 
execute new defense strategies and allocate resources and the manner in which Section 913 specifically could 
“encroach on the Executive's exclusive authority to conduct foreign relations and could severely hamper U.S. ability 
to conduct bilateral space cooperation activities with key allies.”).  See Statement of Administration Policy, OFFICE 
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. 4310 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 2013.  
277 The first certification provision in Section 913 requires the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, and the Director of National Intelligence to jointly submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
certification that such agreement “will be equitable, enhance national security, and have no militarily significant 
impact on the ability of the United States to conduct military or intelligence activities.” 2013 NDAA, supra note 276, 
§ 913(a)(2).  
278 Id., at § 913(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
279 Statement by the President on H.R. 4310, THE WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, January 3, 2013, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/01/03/statement-president-hr-4310 (further declaring that “[i]n 
these instances, my Administration will interpret and implement these provisions in a manner that does not interfere 
with my constitutional authority to conduct diplomacy.”). 
280 For a discussion of related issues, see Beard, supra note 275, at 10581-10582. 
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possible legal significance of this soft law instrument.  As Senator Ben Nelson remarked to 
administration officials in Congressional hearings on the proposed Code, “[i]t may not be a treaty, 
but as you well know, it will establish international norms amongst nations.”281  In fact, lines 
separating the promotion of new “norms” found in legally non-binding instruments (that the 
United States expects other countries to follow) and efforts to establish new binding rules of 
customary international law are easily blurred, especially as U.S. Executive Branch officials 
continue to promote the Code as an instrument for setting “norms for which responsible space-
faring nations would conform their conduct.”282                                   
 
For purposes of legal analysis, non-binding “norms” or guidelines found in soft law 
instruments must be distinguished from legally binding rules of customary international law 
(which are sometimes also referred to as “norms”).  Customary international law consists of a set 
of legal obligations arising from the practice of states and is recognized as a “leading, well-
respected source of international law, fully on par with treaties.”283  In the words of the American 
Law Institute's Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, customary 
international law emanates “from a general and consistent practice of states, followed by them 
from a sense of legal obligation.”284  
 
Customary international law has played a key role in space.  For example, many of the 
most important and fundamental principles of space law found in the Outer Space Treaty have 
been described as essentially codifying existing customary international law.285  Significantly, the 
customary international law version of these rules has achieved wider or “more comprehensive 
geographic coverage” than the treaty versions.286  As discussed in Part II above, customary 
international law rules governing space activities have often emerged from soft law instruments, 
including, in some circumstances, from U.N. General Assembly Resolutions.287 
                                                 
281 Hearing to Receive Testimony on Military Space Programs in Review of the Defense Authorization Request for 
Fiscal Year 2013 and the Future Years Defense Program, Before the Subcomm. on Strat. Forces of the Comm. on 
Armed Services, 112th Cong. 3 (March 21, 2012). 
282 See, e.g., Id., at 9, (testimony of Madelyn Creedon, Assistant Sec’y of Defense for Global Strat. Aff.)  (stating that 
“[t]here are a number of responsible behaviors that we hope this code will identify and then set what would be the norms 
for which responsible space-faring nations would conform their conduct.”).  
283 David A. Koplow, ASAT-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regulation of Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1187, 1194 (2009). 
284 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 102.2 (1987). 
285 Vladlen S. Vereshchetin & Gennady M. Danilenko, Custom as a Source of International Law of Outer Space, 13 
J. SPACE L. 22, 25 (1985) (further noting that “the analysis of the practice of states before the conclusion of the 1967 
Outer Space Treaty shows that historically custom was the first source of the international law of outer space.”);  
NANDASIRI JASENTULIYANA, SPACE LAW: DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 46 (1992) (describing the Outer Space Treaty 
as the “Magna Carta of international space law” and noting that it was “built on several principles already enunciated 
in the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space.”). 
286 Koplow, supra note 283, at 1234. The International Court of Justice maintains that customary international law 
rules underlying an international convention continue to exist erga omnes for both parties and non-parties.  See MARK 
EUGEN VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A MANUAL ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES 151-152 (1997) (also noting two alternative views when pre-existing customary 
international law rules are codified in a convention: that these rules may be “crowded out” by the convention or that 
they may simply parallel the convention, “at least as regards non-parties.”). 
287 Frans von der Dunk, Contradictio in Terminis or Realpolitik? A Qualified Plea for a Role of ‘Soft Law’ in the 
Context of Space Activities, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 26, at 31, 32. (noting that the origins of space law can 
be traced to “a handful of internal administrative and/or non-legally binding United Nations General Assembly 
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A non-binding principle contained in a soft law instrument may thus become a binding 
rule of customary international law, but only if it enjoys sufficient conforming “general practice” 
by states and is ultimately “accepted as law.”288  It should be noted that even if a document like 
the proposed Code is initially declared by all subscribing states to be a “legally non-binding” 
instrument, this may not prevent it from later contributing to the formation of a rule of customary 
international law.  For example, during the consideration of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights at a 1948 session of the U.N. General Assembly, the U.S. Representative emphasized that 
“It is not a treaty; it is not an international agreement.  It is not and does not purport to be a 
statement of law or a legal obligation.”289   However, after years of conforming state practice and 
reaffirmation of the norms in the Declaration by the United States, it was not difficult for a U.S. 
federal court to later declare that one of those norms, the prohibition of torture, had become a 
binding rule on all countries under customary international law.290   
 
The process by which customary international law (CIL) is formed is not, however, 
without its critics.  For example, Professor J. Patrick Kelly has strongly criticized the lack of 
democratic legitimacy in this process on several levels, arguing that “the majority of nations and 
peoples of the world rarely participate in the creation of customary rules that limit their policy 
choices and sovereignty” and that this “democracy deficit” broadly infects the process of CIL 
norm formation.291 
 
It is true that traditional international law doctrine has generally treated states and 
governments as opaque “black boxes” and has thus “ignored the internal observance of 
democracy as a relevant factor affecting their capacity to have a voice in international law 
making.”292  Yet even while most international law scholars may be unwilling to fully embrace 
Professor Kelly’s argument that the methodologies of all the major normative theories of 
customary international law eviscerate the democratic legitimacy of CIL norms, there is still value 
in recognizing and encouraging state participation in this process that also reflects the 
participation of the people that these states are presumed to represent.293  
                                                                                                                                                               
resolutions between 1958 and 1963…”);  See supra notes 56 thru 60 and accompanying text (discussing the limited 
circumstances in which U.N. General Assembly Resolutions form the basis for binding rules of customary 
international law.).  
288 Continental Shelf case (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta) , Judgment, 3 June 1985, ICJ Reports 1985, pp. 29–
30, § 27. 
289 19 DEPT. OF STATE BULL. 751 (1948). 
290 Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (“This prohibition [the right to be free from torture] has 
become part of customary international law, as evidenced and defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
General Assembly Resolution 217 (III)(A) (Dec. 10, 1948) which states, in the plainest of terms, “no one shall be 
subjected to torture.”). 
291 J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 449, 518-520 (2000) (Prof. 
Kelly argues that the democratic legitimacy of customary international law (CIL) norms is undermined by both the 
limited number of states that participate in formulating those norms and by the lack of any participation by people 
represented by states: “much of CIL is determined by the academic and judicial elites or by the practices of a 
minority of states without the participation or direct assent of the majority of states compromising the legitimacy of 
CIL norms.”).  
292 BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 156 
(2010). 
293 Id. (Professor Lepard argues that “[f]inally, in the case of all norms…greater weight should be given to the views 
of states that have some mechanism for taking the views of their citizens and other inhabitants into account, such as 
democratic elections or consultations.”  He suggests that such an approach enhances the “democratic legitimacy” of 
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International legal obligations which are made pursuant to treaties or other 
international agreements often involve legislative institutions and thus, at least in democratic 
states, involve the participation of the elected representatives of the people in those states.  
But in the case of other activities involving a state’s foreign affairs, including the signing of 
legally non-binding documents that may give rise to customary international law, in some 
countries the executive alone may speak for the government and the people.294  
 
The ongoing controversy in the United States over the possible signature by the 
President of the proposed Code implicates issues larger than domestic partisan politics and 
interesting separation of power issues within the U.S. constitutional framework.  Among 
other things, the Code controversy highlights the limitations of non-binding soft law 
instruments to generate legally binding “norms” of conduct under customary international 
law.  The unusual case of the executive and legislative branches of a major democracy 
explicitly taking opposite views of the suitability of a soft law instrument (in this case the 
proposed Code) to serve as a basis for future international legal obligations threatens not only 
the future of U.S. participation in the Code, but also the key role that the United States has 
long played in the development of the international legal regime governing activities in 
space.295  If the United States were to approve the Code under these circumstances, it would 
also give the Code an even more uncertain status, further undermining its relevance as well 
as the underlying commitments of subscribing states. 
 
The significance for international space law of the dispute over the Code between the U.S. 
Executive and Legislative branches may be far-reaching.  Although partisan disputes related to 
international activities are hardly unusual in the United States, the formal and unprecedented 
                                                                                                                                                               
customary international law while at the same time “does not reject the legitimacy of the customary lawmaking 
process as being irremediably ‘undemocratic’ by nature.”). 
294 The extent of an executive’s sole powers in foreign affairs varies with each state’s constitutional framework. 
In the United States, the standard citation for the president’s power in the area of foreign affairs is found in  
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (which noted that “in this vast external 
realm [of foreign affairs], with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone 
has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation….As Marshall said in his great argument of 
March 7, 1800, in the House of Representatives, ‘The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external 
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.’").  Although a detailed discussion of this subject is 
beyond the scope of this article, such absolute statements about presidential authority risk over-simplifying 
complex separation of powers in the U.S. legal system. Even the Curtiss-Wright case is less than it appears, 
since it did not involve the question of independent powers of the president but whether Congress had 
“delegated its legislative power too broadly when it authorized the president to declare an arms embargo in 
South America.” Louis Fisher, The Law: Presidential Inherent Power: The “Sole Organ” Doctrine, 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 139, 140 (March 2007).  Rather than providing a clear roadmap for Congress and the 
President to share powers in the conduct of foreign affairs, one presidential scholar has suggested that the 
Constitution is instead “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing foreign policy.” EDWIN S. 
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE AND POWERS 1789-1959, 171 (1957) 
295 See, e.g., EDYTHE E. WEEKS, OUTER SPACE DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND SPACE LAW, 51-54, 
128 (2012) (noting how in the early epoch of the space era the United States played a key role in building the 
foundation of the legal framework for space – especially the Kennedy Administration’s contributions in facilitating 
the progress of international space law and the Johnson Administration’s subsequent role in “keeping up the 
momentum of international space lawmaking” – and how the United States has continued to play “a key role in 
influencing space development regime change” through subsequent epochs of outer space development.).  
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action taken by the United States Congress to restrict the potential legal impact of the Code 
potentially sets the stage for a broad and unfortunate attack on the use of soft law instruments as a 
basis for forming future binding obligations in space under customary international law.  
 
The controversy over the Code in the United States highlights the limitations of soft 
instruments when they are used in place of legally binding international agreements and the 
process whereby which such legally binding agreements are adopted.  It also illustrates the 
dangers that such non-binding documents may pose if they are used by the executives of states to 
build norms in such a way that they further contribute to a “democracy deficit” in customary 
international law.  This is especially true for democratic states in the area of arms control where 
important issues of national security are likely to call for processes which reflect a national 
consensus and thus involve the participation of the people through their elected representatives in 
order to obtain broad public support for the agreement.296  Soft law instruments may thus be a 
problematic substitute for legally binding agreements on several levels, particularly when used to 
address arms control and security issues.   
 
Part V:   Guiding Principles for Solutions in Space 
 
Many challenges now confront states in their use of outer space, but none pose a greater 
existential threat than the possibility that debris generated by human activities may render space 
unsafe and unusable for hundreds or even thousands of years.  However, the insecure strategic 
environment in space means many proposed cooperative measures will not be able to effectively 
address this threat and may instead only increase dangerous risks.   
 
The dissimilar problems of space debris and arms control are generally addressed as 
separate areas of concern by the international community.  This is because the legal and political 
framework which underlies efforts to manage the critical problem of orbital space debris (which 
also includes the domestic laws and administrative regulations of many states) and the framework 
which addresses arms control issues in space relate to fundamentally different subject areas.  
Nonetheless, the two subject areas may implicate parallel concerns or involve interdependent 
problems, as evidenced by the Code’s emphasis on preventing an arms race and regulating 
military activities in outer space while reducing the creation of orbital space debris.297 
 
Within the context of these different subject areas and frameworks, the search continues 
for the “next step” towards meaningful international collaboration in addressing the most acute 
                                                 
296 Richard B. Bilder, Formal Treaties and Tacit Agreements: An Exchange, 41 BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 51, 
52 (April 1985) (“In view of the importance of obtaining broad congressional and public support for arms control 
arrangements, is it wise for the president to bypass normal constitutional agreement-making procedures?  Formal 
arms control treaties provide the requisite degree of predictability and assurance…Moreover…[i]f the agreement is 
approved, it is likely to reflect a national consensus and have considerable support and stability.”). In the United 
States, where arms control agreements have “almost invariably been negotiated as treaties,” it has further been argued 
that the gravity of the issues addressed in such agreements “creates a presumption in favor of treaties with full Senate 
participation in the process of ratification.” See ROBERT E. WILLIAMS, JR. & PAUL R. VIOTTI, ARMS CONTROL: 
HISTORY, THEORY, AND POLICY 45 (2012). 
297 Some authors further suggest that lethal debris represents its own “haphazard and inadvertent weaponization of 
space.”  See Micahel Krepon, Space Code of Conduct Mugged in New York, Aug. 4, 2015, http://krepon. 
armscontrolwonk.com/archive/4712/space-code-of-conduct-mugged-in-new-york.   
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problems confronting the international community in space, particularly the problem of orbital 
space debris.  The proposed Code, a flawed soft law variant, is not a promising step.  Soft law is 
not, however, the only available solution or basis for that next step.  Instead, certain alternative 
principles emerge from the preceding analysis which may help guide states in their next attempt 
to design other more effective instruments, regimes and approaches to advance the long-term and 
sustainable use of outer space.   
 
A. Pursue Hard Law Solutions with the Leading Spacefaring States 
 
 Meaningful initiatives to regulate weapons and military activities in space cannot succeed 
when their design is divorced from the reality of the security dilemmas and perceived threats that 
states face there.  While soft law instruments may give the appearance of progress, they 
notoriously achieve little on their own in addressing critical security issues in space.298  In this 
realm, soft law instruments unfortunately do not assist states to convey credible commitments to 
each other, do not provide the necessary assurances to prevent defensive defections from 
international regimes, and do not create clear obligations to serve as the basis for effective 
monitoring and verification regimes designed to prevent offensive defections.  Instead, soft law’s 
shortcomings, linked to design choices that weaken commitments along the dimensions of 
precision or obligation or both, inspire uncertainty, reduce confidence, and dramatically diminish 
the effectiveness any arms control measure in space.   
 
The benefits of hard law regimes and the disadvantages of soft law instruments in the field 
of arms control are compelling.  This helps explain why, despite continuing and sometimes 
intense diplomatic efforts to promote the adoption of the Code, a wide variety of experts from 
numerous space-faring countries agree that a hard law approach is ultimately needed to deal with 
the greatest challenges confronting the international community in space.299  It is also consistent 
with demands by several major space stakeholders (including Brazil, India, South Africa, Russia 
and China) that work on the Code “should not prejudice or delay the elaboration of legally-
binding instruments to strengthen the existing legal framework for outer space.”300   
 
As previously noted, however, proponents of soft law approaches often view legally 
binding instruments for space activities as too difficult to achieve, pointing to the lack of any new 
hard law agreements since 1979.  Unfortunately, the attention, time and government resources 
dedicated to promoting the Code appear to be diverting efforts from more meaningful and 
                                                 
298 Aoki, supra note 56, at 85 (“…once critical national security interest is concerned, then, only legally-binding rules 
can govern the activities of individual nation.”); Elatawy, supra note 83, at 50 (“There is a necessity for further 
measures to govern outer space activities through the negotiation and conclusion of further legally binding 
instrument(s)…”.). 
299 See, e.g., Juqian, supra note 158, at 43 ("Though voluntary ‘rules of the road’ have their advantages, ‘soft law’ is 
not enough for dealing with more and more complicated space activities. Rules with legally binding force are better 
for the international community.”);  Fermin Romero Vazquez, EU Efforts for an ICoC: A Mexican Perspective, in 
AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 32, at 137, 141 (“Countries such as Mexico have argued the need for legally binding 
instruments to develop space law.”); Lele, supra note 78, at 20 (“India, being an important player in the Space arena, 
needs to lobby for a transparent and binding CoC, which would eventually help in realising Space security.”). 
300 Meyer, supra note 226. 
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important work on any new legally binding agreements.301  The lengthy, continuing state-
sponsored deliberations related to the Code present only an illusion of progress, one that 
diminishes interest in more effective legally binding agreements, reduces pressure on states to 
pursue such alternatives, creates the false impression of agreement when there is none, and 
induces false expectations that may later lead to disagreement and increased conflict when those 
expectations are disappointed.302  
 
Commentators who are not optimistic about hard law approaches in space have suggested 
that the different and apparently irreconcilable interests of different states are responsible for 
preventing the conclusion of any new legally binding multilateral agreement in the field of space 
law since 1979.303   In this environment, bottom-up soft law approaches may continue to be an 
option for progress in some areas, particularly where consensus can be achieved on various 
technical and procedural issues and incorporated in non-binding standards and guidelines (which 
in turn may ultimately lead to hard rules in conventions or customary international law).  
 
However, the security matters addressed by the Code are not conducive to resolution by 
soft law approaches, nor do they comprise an area in which soft law instruments effectively lay 
the foundation for the development of legally binding rules.  Soft law in this context may instead 
present an obstacle to development of such hard rules, even more so when ambiguities in these 
instruments allow subscribing states to take competing positions and approaches with respect to 
key rules.304   
 
Rather than forming an agreed basis for the development of future norms, non-binding and 
indeterminate instruments in these situations may, as noted, be nothing more than a form of a 
“deferred confrontation” or simply reflect a profound lack of consensus on issues that are 
necessary to conclude a legally binding agreement.305  Instead of creating a solid foundation on 
which to build new legally binding obligations, soft law here may instead make such new legally 
binding norms even more difficult to achieve. 
 
The design choices for the Code thus appear to reflect a large degree of continuing 
disagreement – and this lack of consensus is further demonstrated by the continuing unwillingness 
of several key spacefaring nations to subscribe to it.  The struggles of the Code do not, however, 
indicate a need for more soft law.  Instead, they indicate a need for targeted hard law initiatives 
(involving the participation of all major space stakeholders) to serve as a first step in addressing 
the most widely acknowledged threats confronting the safety and security of objects in space – 
                                                 
301 K. R. Sridhara Murthi & Mukund Rao, ICoC: Perspective for India, in AWAITING LAUNCH, supra note 32, at 159, 
167 (“…there have been fears that [the ICoC] may slow down or divert efforts to build legally binding commitments 
that are essential for assuring the safety, security and sustainability of space activities.”). 
302 BILDER, supra note 69, at 1703-1704.  
303 Juqian, supra note158, at 43. 
304 Ambiguous language used in an instrument to paper over differences between states may have a variety of 
negative effects on long-term efforts to develop binding international agreements, because such language can, among 
other things, “foster not only a false sense that an issue is no longer of concern because it has been resolved; it can 
also foster dangerous misconceptions of what has been gained or conceded in an agreement.” See Kittrie, supra note 
122, at 1703-1704.  
305 Chayes & Shelton, supra note 133, at 525 (noting that “recourse to non-binding norms may reflect a lack of 
consensus on the issues that make it impossible to conclude a binding agreement…”). 
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while attempting to avoid the most common traps or obstacles to arms control efforts in a highly 
unstable geopolitical environment like space.  
 
B.  Avoid Arms Control Traps in Space  
 
 Any successful effort to achieve legally binding restrictions on military activities or 
weapons in space must focus on specific, definable, and limited objectives or run afoul of issues 
that have historically ensured deadlock among suspicious and insecure adversaries.306  Some 
seemingly desirable goals, however, are likely to ensure failure.   
 
The first such problematic goal involves attempting to use arms control agreements or 
other instruments to comprehensively ensure peace in space.  Unfortunately, the integration of 
modern military systems on earth, sea, air and space guarantees that at some point states seeking 
to disrupt or deny the ability of an adversary (such as the United States) to project power will find 
space capabilities to be a particularly appealing target, especially in the early stages of a crisis or 
conflict.307  The presence of so many things of military value in space thus makes actions by an 
adversary to neutralize, disrupt or destroy these things likely during a major conflict on earth.308   
 
 The second problematic arms control goal in space that seems certain to ensure stalemate 
involves attempting to define and prohibit military technologies with a view to broadly prevent 
the weaponization of space.  Clearly defining a space weapon for purposes of any legally binding 
arms control agreement is a daunting task, one which is made particularly challenging by the 
“essentially military nature of space technology.”309  As noted, space technologies are routinely 
viewed as dual-use in nature, meaning that they can be readily employed for both civilian and 
military uses.  Determining the ultimate purpose of many space technologies may thus depend on 
discerning the intentions of states, a process perhaps better suited for psychological than legal 
evaluation.310 
 
                                                 
306 BRUCE W. MACDONALD, CHINA, SPACE WEAPONS, AND U.S. SECURITY 30 (Council on Foreign Relations Special 
Report, 2008) (arguing that sweeping arms control proposals are unlikely to be verifiable and that historically such 
overbroad proposals “have acted more as a delaying tactic than serious policy.”). 
307 Schulte & Schaffer, supra note 43, at 10 (“For an adversary seeking to disrupt or deny the ability of the United 
States to project power, space capabilities may provide an appealing target set, especially early in a crisis or 
conflict.”); Gordon G. Chang, The Space Arms Race Begins, FORBES, Nov. o6, 2009, 
http://www.forbes.com/2009/11/05/space-arms-race-china-united-states-opinions-columnists-gordon-g-chang.html 
(quoting the Chief of the Chinese Air Force in an article in the People’s Liberation Army Daily as saying 
“Competition between military forces is developing towards the sky and space, it is extending beyond the atmosphere 
and even into outer space…This development is a historical inevitability and cannot be undone.”). 
308 Kueter, supra note 115, at 3 (“War will find its way to space because there are things of military value in space 
and their denial or destruction would net a military advantage during a conflict.”). 
309 Aoki, supra note 56, at 60; Frans von der Dunk, Contradictio in Terminis or Realpolitik? A Qualified Plea for a 
Role of ‘Soft Law’ in the Context of Space Activities, in SOFT LAW IN SPACE, supra note 26, at 37 (noting that 
“military and strategic considerations” are “almost always prominently present in the context of space activities.”).   
310 Jane C. Hu, The Battle for Space, SLATE, Dec. 23 2014, http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_ 
science/space_20/2014/12/space_weapon_law_u_s_china_and_russia_developing_dangerous_dual_use_spacecraft.ht
ml (noting that “it’s difficult—if not impossible—to determine what counts as a space weapon. Identifying space 
weapons has become a psychological game: Experts must infer the intentions of the nation launching space 
objects…”). 
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 Further complicating the classification of space military technologies is the inherent 
difficulty in distinguishing most space weapons on the basis of their offensive and defensive 
roles or even their specific missions.311  For example, this problem lies at the heart of debates 
over the status and future of ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs, since the technology 
underlying BMD systems and offensive ASAT weapons is often indistinguishable.312  Vague 
and broad soft law instruments do not resolve this problem, but create instead their own 
confusion and insecurity.  Vague and broad provisions in legally binding agreements that do 
not or cannot distinguish between these missions are similarly problematic. 
 
  These issues, particularly difficulties in distinguishing ASAT and BMD systems, have 
figured prominently in complicating negotiations on space weapons over previous 
decades.313  Similarly, these concerns were a significant factor in initial U.S. opposition to 
the arms control measure proposed by China and Russia (the PPWT) since it prohibits states 
from placing any type of weapon in outer space (regardless of its military mission), thus 
effectively prohibiting the deployment of ballistic missile defense systems.314  Furthermore, 
even if clear legal restrictions could be developed, verifying compliance with respect to 
technology in orbit around Earth would be very difficult (a point conceded even by China 
with respect to its own proposed PPWT).315  
 
  C.  Maintain a Focus on the Most Harmful Conduct 
 
The first steps in successfully addressing the greatest threats to space -- which must be 
consciously undertaken against the backdrop of suspicion, insecurity and fears of a space arms 
race -- are not sweeping and unverifiable bans on weapons or military technologies.316  Instead, 
                                                 
311 David Holloway, The Soviet Perception for Reykjavik: Four Documents, in IMPLICATIONS OF THE REYKJAVIK 
SUMMIT ON ITS TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY 45, 60 (Sidney D. Drell & George P. Shultz eds., 2007) (“Any space-based 
system carrying strike weapons (kinetic, energy beam, nuclear) is both offensive and defensive. There is no basis for 
separating space-based strike systems into offensive and purely defensive categories.”); Peter Hayes, Developments 
in Ballistic Missile Defences, in CELEBRATING THE SPACE AGE, supra note 204, at 21, 22 (“Even a very limited BMD 
system will have significant ASAT capabilities. Thus there is significant overlap of BMD and space weaponization 
issues, which need to be seen as interlinked issues.”).   
312 JOAN JOHNSON-FREESE, SPACE AS A STRATEGIC ASSET 7 (2007) (“A missile that can target another missile in 
flight (missile defense) can also target orbiting satellites…From a technical perspective, it is not difficult to conceive 
of a missile defense system as an offensive antisatellite (ASAT) weapon.”). 
313 Segey Oznobishchev, Codes of Conduct for Outer Space, in OUTER SPACE: WEAPONS, DIPLOMACY, AND 
SECURITY, supra note 164, at 72 (noting that this history “reveals the enormous complexity of trying to impose 
treaty-based legal restrictions on space systems.”). 
314 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the Secretary-General (19 August 
2008), supra note 207, at 2, 4. The latest draft of the PPWT continues to broadly define the term “weapon in outer 
space” as “any outer space object or component thereof which has been produced or converted to destroy, damage or 
disrupt the normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth’s surface or in its atmosphere…” Draft PPWT, 
June 12, 2014, supra note 79, art. I.b. 
315 MACDONALD, supra note 306, at 27 (“Notably, China itself has conceded the difficulty of verifying such an 
agreement.”);  Micah Zenko, supra note 172 (noting that “the United States and most other spacefaring nations 
correctly oppose the draft treaty on the grounds that it would be unverifiable and would not cover ground-based 
systems.”). 
316 Id., at 30 (noting that “[s]weeping proposals are probably unverifiable; certainly most deployment bans on such 
weapons would be. Historically, overbroad proposals have acted more as a delaying tactic than serious policy.”). 
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solutions lie in legally binding prohibitions on specific types of the most harmful conduct, 
restrictions which are also likely to benefit from more feasible methods of verification. 
 
The best target for an initial multilateral agreement effort aimed at increasing safety and 
security in space is not difficult to find.  The widely acknowledged, dangerous and growing 
problem of debris in space is well documented, as is the very real threat that it poses to all future 
uses of space.  ASAT tests rank among the greatest concerns in the creation of such debris, as 
evidenced by the hugely damaging effects of the 2007 Chinese test (which inspired the drafting of 
the Code).  The destruction of one large satellite alone can create as much debris as would 
otherwise by generated by 70 to 80 years of ordinary space activity under strict debris mitigation 
measures.317  It is thus suggested that an urgent and important first step in preventing the further 
production of space debris is an international agreement banning the testing of destructive (debris-
generating) ASATs.318  
 
No international agreement currently bans the testing, deployment or use of ASATs. With 
the exception of a ban on the placement of weapons of mass destruction in space under the Outer 
Space Treaty, no space weapons are currently prohibited by any international agreement at all.319  
As noted, even the IADC Guidelines (and the COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines that 
they inspired), fail to address the problem of ASAT testing.  Such gaps support the larger 
criticism by many states and legal experts that the existing legal framework governing space is 
not adequate to ensure the security of space objects or prevent an arms race in space.320  Yet 
addressing all these deficiencies at once is not a necessary first step. 
 
 Instead of attempting to prohibit broad categories of technology and their use (or 
designating all ASATs as a prohibited class of weapons), there should be a focus on specific 
conduct involving the most  damaging ASAT weapons technology –  interceptor vehicles or “hit-
to-kill” systems  employing kinetic energy (KE) – which represent the greatest current threat of 
weapons-related debris generation in space.321  Fortuitously, the testing of these weapons also 
presents a particular type of conduct that is within the competence of states to clearly define, 
regulate and verify under an appropriate international legal regime.322   
 
Prohibiting tests of KE, hit-to-kill, debris-generating ASATs (or “destructive” ASAT 
tests) restricts the use of a weapon that appears to be in the early stages of spreading around the 
                                                 
317 Wright, supra note 216, at 24. 
318 Jeffrey Lewis, ‘Hit-to-kill’ and the Threat to Space Assets, in CELEBRATING THE SPACE AGE, supra note 204, at 
22. 
319 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. IV. 
320 See, e.g., Tronchetti, supra note 28, at 367 (“…the majority of states and legal experts deem [the existing 
international legal framework] not adequate to prevent an arms race in space and to guarantee the security of space 
objects.”). 
321 Lewis, supra note 318, at 22-23; MACDONALD, supra note 306, at 30 (noting that “[o]ne possible restriction that 
merits consideration is a ban on KE-ASAT tests” and that satellites destroyed by KE-ASATs “could render important 
orbital areas inhospitable for military or civilian use for decades, even centuries.”). 
322 Lewis, supra note 318, at 23 (noting that an advantage of a ban on kinetic-energy ASAT testing is “that it would 
be both easy to define and to verify, and would allow for a dialogue to begin without sidestepping any issues.”); 
Wright, supra note 216, at 26 (“One suggestion was that an advantage of a partial arms control measure, such as a 
ban on kinetic-energy ASAT testing, is that it would be both easy to define and to verify, and would allow for a 
dialogue to begin without sidestepping any issues.”). 
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world, addresses real and effective technologies (while resisting futile attempts to define and 
regulate future exotic technologies), and maintains a narrow focus on banning the most 
threatening current technology – thus avoiding the difficulties inherent in achieving 
comprehensive arms control agreements.323  Because the orbital lifetime of fragments is shorter in 
low-earth orbits than in higher orbits (where there may be little or no natural orbital decay due to 
atmospheric drag), it is has been suggested that an explicit ban on ASAT testing in higher 
geosynchronous orbits would be especially compelling.324   
 
The growing threat of orbital space debris now threatens to make space unusable for all 
spacefaring countries, even for the great space powers.  Once before, when nuclear tests in space 
by the superpowers in the Cold War brought competing nations to the brink of ruining orbital 
space and causing great damage on earth, both sides accepted mutual restraint to avert disaster 
and concluded a legally binding, multilateral agreement banning nuclear tests in space.325  For all 
spacefaring countries, and especially for the major space powers, the time for similar, focused, 
legally-binding restraint with respect to the issue of ASAT testing appears to have arrived.    
 
D.  Develop Solutions in the Context of Insecurity, the Geopolitics of Space, and U.S.     
Skepticism 
 
 China, Russia and the United States have all successfully demonstrated ASAT capabilities 
in tests of various ASAT systems, including some which apparently involved directed energy 
weapons (particularly lasers) designed to incapacitate or “dazzle” satellites in non-destructive 
tests.326  However, the Russian government has not conducted a destructive ASAT test since 1983 
and the last debris-generating American ASAT test took place in 1985.327  While the Chinese 
government has continued to develop new ASAT capabilities, it was clearly surprised by the 
widespread international outrage over its 2007 ASAT test and has not conducted any similar 
debris-generating tests since that time.328  Although these three ASAT-active countries appear to 
                                                 
323 Lewis, supra note 318, at 23. 
324 MACDONALD, supra note 306, at 30.  As previously noted, however, debris in low earth orbit may persist for 
many decades, presenting a persistent threat to all spacecraft passing through it.  
325 MOLTZ, supra note  94, at 28-29 (2014) (noting that a 1.4 megaton nuclear test in 1962 400km above earth created 
such large EMP emissions that it disabled seven satellites in low earth orbit.); Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests 
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Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas, May 25, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 1168, T.I.A.S. 7379, 852 U.N.T.S. 151. 
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327 Id.; see Koplow, supra note 283, at 1210 (noting that the 300 pieces of trackable debris generated by the last U.S 
destructive ASAT test on September 13, 1985, took nineteen years to degrade out of orbit.). 
328 Phillip C. Saunders, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on 
“China’s Space and Counterspace Programs” 10 (February 18, 2015), http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/Saunders_Testimony2.18.15.pdf (noting that Chinese officials appear to have learned from the mistakes they 
made in both the conduct of the 2007 ASAT test and how the information was presented publicly and observing that 
“subsequent 2010 and 2013 tests…were conducted against sub-orbital targets and did not create any long-lived space 
debris.”). 
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have little interest in conducting further destructive ASAT tests, they nonetheless have much to 
lose if other states pursue such testing. 
 
New destructive ASAT tests would not only threaten space with vast new clouds of debris, 
but would also bring new fears, instability and risks of weaponization.329  A new wave of 
destructive ASAT weapon tests is not unimaginable, since countries other than China, Russia and 
the United States, including India, Israel, and Japan, remain interested in developing hit-to-kill 
ASAT technology.330  As rivalries in space expand far beyond the confines of the Cold War, it is 
important to note that even a limited conflict in space could be devastating, since the debris 
generated by such a conflict could result in the possible loss of near-earth orbit.331  
 
Beyond the potential strategic benefits for the United States of a legally binding 
multilateral ban on destructive ASAT tests, no country has a greater stake than the United States 
in minimizing the amount of orbital debris (since it makes the most use of space).332  The most 
serious policy concern related to such a ban, at least in the view of some skeptical members of the 
U.S. Congress, remains the possible negative impact on U.S. BMD programs.333  For this reason, 
the United States may prefer to pursue a partial but nonetheless effective ban on the most 
destructive ASAT testing, one which is limited to at least prohibiting tests above a specified 
altitude (thus greatly reducing or eliminating the production of any long-lived debris while still 
permitting effective ballistic missile interception tests at lower altitudes).334   
 
To be effective, a ban on ASAT testing should be incorporated in a legally binding 
international convention that includes the major spacefaring states.  Through this mechanism, 
states can convey credible commitments to not conduct ASAT tests, provide assurances of their 
compliance, and establish a framework with clear obligations on which arms control compliance, 
monitoring and verification measures can be built.  It would also provide a solid foundation for 
making a prohibition on destructive ASAT tests a rule of customary international law.335  
                                                 
329 Lewis, supra note 318318, at 23 (noting that the introduction of ASAT weapons raise issues of “international 
stability” in addition to making it much harder “to reach cooperative agreements on issues such as debris mitigation 
or space traffic management.”). 
330 Id.; Ross Liemer & Christopher F. Chyba, A Verifiable Limited Test Ban for Anti-satellite Weapons, 33 WASH. Q. 
149, 154 (July 2010) (noting how India reportedly plans to “develop the capacity to destroy satellites in low-earth and 
polar orbits” and that Japanese legislation now permits “the use of outer space for military purposes of a defensive 
nature.”); Jeffrey Lewis, “Hit-to-Kill” and the Threat to Space Assets, in CELEBRATING THE SPACE AGE, supra note 
204, at 147, 149 (discussing kinetic energy ASAT development work in Israel, Japan, and European countries). 
331 MOLTZ, supra note 94, at 4 (2014). 
332 Liemer & Chyba, supra note 330, at 154. 
333 See, e.g., 160 Cong. Rec. S6936 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 2015) (letter from Sen. David Vitter and Congressman Doug 
Lamborn to Mr. Frank Rose, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of State for Space and Def. Pol’y (Nov. 12, 2014)) (stating that 
“we seek to understand the Administration's position on space arms control, specifically, any ‘debris generating 
kinetic energy ASAT testing moratorium’” and that “we fear a new threat to our ability to protect U.S. outer space 
capabilities, and, perhaps even to develop our missile defenses.”).  
334 Liemer & Chyba, supra note 330, at 156 (noting that “a test ban above 250—300 km has evidently been the de 
facto, voluntary practice of the United States in recent years” and that the U.S. Missile Defense Agency “reports that 
its ballistic missile intercept tests were conducted at an altitude of 230 km.” The authors further note that “… 
evidently a ban on testing above 250 or 300 km would not unduly interfere with missile defense tests. The United 
States would remain free (as would other nations) to intercept de-orbiting satellites or to conduct ballistic missile 
intercept tests below the specified altitude.”). 
335 Currently, no rule of customary international law prohibits ASAT testing, even though an examination of state 
practice indicates that barely half a dozen ASAT testing events have occurred within the past two decades, conducted 
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Participation by the legislatures of participating states in approving or authorizing the agreement 
would further advance these goals and also strengthen the credibility of underlying state 
commitments. 
 
With respect to U.S. involvement in a ban on destructive ASAT tests, a legally binding 
agreement (benefitting from the authorization or approval of the U.S. Congress in the form of a 
treaty, congressional-executive agreement, or statutory authorization) that clearly prohibits such 
ASAT tests would more effectively contribute to the emergence of binding legal norm under 
customary international law and also enhance rather than diminish the leadership role that the 
United States has long played in the development of international space law.336 
 
A final, practical, strategic reality remains for the United States and other countries as they 
contemplate the conclusion of appropriate legally binding multilateral conventions restricting 
ASAT tests or other explicitly defined harmful conduct in space. U.S. military planners (as well 
as the military authorities of the other space powers) must remain prepared to protect their assets 
in space in the event of a conflict in the strategically vital domain of space.   
 
In spite of the goals of peaceful cooperation in space, U.S. military doctrine clearly 
requires the U.S. forces to be capable in time of conflict to take measures “to prevent an 
adversary's hostile use of US/third-party space capabilities,” to successfully engage in “offensive 
operations to negate an adversary's space capabilities  used to interfere with or attack US/allied 
space systems,” and to “negate adversary space capabilities through deception, disruption, denial, 
degradation, or destruction actions.”337  Achieving these mission objectives seems highly unlikely 
if U.S. forces do not have the necessary weapons to achieve and maintain superior military 
capabilities.338  
 
Some commentators have thus suggested that while the United States continues to pursue 
appropriate multilateral security agreements (such a one banning debris-generating ASAT tests) 
and continues to refrain from taking clearly provocative actions in space (particularly the flight 
testing and deployment of clearly dedicated space weaponry), it should maintain a “hedging 
                                                                                                                                                               
by only three states.  Unfortunately, the subjective element or opinion juris necessary to establish a rule of customary 
international law (that states are conforming to what they view is a legal obligation) is clearly lacking.  See Koplow, 
supra note 283, at 1237 (noting that “the three ASAT-active States have certainly never indicated that any existing 
legal compulsion circumscribes their actions” and noting the conspicuous failure on the part of states to label the 
2007 Chinese ASAT test as “’illegal’ or ‘inconsistent with’ any particular legal obligations.”). 
336 As noted, clearly formulated rules of a “norm-creating character” which are first framed in legally binding 
agreements may later become binding rules of customary international law if they subsequently enjoy the 
“widespread and representative participation” of states and this state practice is carried out in such a way “as to be 
evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it.”  See N. Sea 
Cont'l Shelf Case, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42, 44.  
337 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ET AL., JOINT STAFF PUBLICATION 3-14: SPACE OPERATIONS (29 May 2013), II-8, 
available at http://www.dtic.mil/ doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf.  
338 Report of the Commission to Assess United States Security Space Management and Organization, U.S. DEPT. OF 
DEFENSE, Executive Summary, x (Jan. 11, 2001), available at http://www.dod.gov/pubs/ space20010111.html 
(“…we know from history that every medium—air, land and sea—has seen conflict.  Reality indicates that space will 
be no different. Given this virtual certainty, the U.S. must develop the means both to deter and to defend against 
hostile acts in and from space. This will require superior space capabilities.”). 
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strategy against space warfare capabilities or unpleasant surprises.”339  Such a hedging strategy 
requires, among other things, laboratory research and development of basic ASAT technologies 
with a central goal of “providing assurance that the United States is not surprised, and 
technologically outdistanced, by advances in ASAT capabilities that another country is able to 
achieve.”340  
  
With these goals in mind, any arms control agreement or soft law instrument that the 
United States contemplates joining which will regulate space activities must be sufficiently 
precise to ensure that no implicit or de facto restrictions are imposed on essential defense 
capabilities or the ability to engage in strategic “hedging” (particularly military space R&D 
programs).341  As discussed above, however, the broad and imprecise terms of the Code may raise 
concerns that the scrutiny of military programs by civil society in liberal democracies could result 
in de facto restrictions on important military R&D space weapon programs and related activities. 
 
Part VI: Conclusion   
 
Efforts to prevent the proliferation of space debris cannot be fully realized without also 
dealing with the threat to the sustainable use of space posed by destructive ASAT tests.  The 
Code’s proposed application of its own variant of soft law to these very different but related 
problem areas unfortunately portends failure.  Modest but important progress in both these areas 
is, however, feasible through limited hard law approaches which focus on destructive ASAT 
testing in the context of the reality of acute security concerns.   
 
Such tailored hard law approaches offer a genuine “next step” in solving the most serious 
problems confronting the international community in space.  They also complement, rather than 
interfere with, successful bottom-up soft law approaches which have allowed the space agencies 
of leading spacefaring states to generate technical guidelines reducing the routine generation of 
orbital space debris.  These hard law approaches stand in stark contrast to the flawed variant of 
soft law embodied in the Code, one which risks confusion and increased insecurity even as it 
distracts states from pursuing more effective models.  
 
While the U.S. government has indicated some interest in pursuing a ban on destructive 
ASAT tests, no proposal to ban ASAT tests is under consideration at this time.  In spite of the 
merits of such an initiative, U.S. government officials indicated in late 2014 that no decision has 
                                                 
339 MICHAEL KREPON & CHRISTOPHER CLARY, SPACE ASSURANCE OR SPACE DOMINANCE?: THE CASE AGAINST 
WEAPONIZING SPACE 78 (2003) (further arguing that deployment of war-fighting capabilities by the United States “is 
likely to generate the launch of relatively cheap, low-tech, but lethal ASATs by weaker adversaries” and that “the 
flight testing and deployment of dedicated space weaponry would add new instability in crisis and new impulses 
toward escalation. It would be folly to invite these consequences unless it is absolutely necessary to do so.”).   
340 Id., at 80 (noting that another central goal is “to provide assurance to potential adversaries that, should they initiate 
the flight-testing and deployment of space warfare capabilities, they will prompt a most unwelcome reaction by the 
United States.”). 
341 Such policies are generally consistent with the position of the current and previous U.S. administrations.  As 
previously noted, Secretary of State Clinton reaffirmed in 2012 the central U.S. commitment to preserving its national 
defense capabilities in space by noting that the United States will not enter into any code of conduct “that in any way 
constrains our national security-related activities in space or our ability to protect the United States and our allies.” 
See supra note 232, and related text.  
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been made to propose such an agreement.342  When asked to further explain this position during 
recent Congressional hearings, administration officials repeated that they had no plans to pursue a 
ban on debris-generating ASAT testing, noting instead that “[c]urrently, our diplomatic focus is 
on the development of an International Code of Conduct on Outer Space Activities.”343  
 
The Code thus continues to consume the time and effort of the government of the United 
States and the governments of other states in the international community, diverting resources that 
could otherwise be dedicated to more meaningful steps to improve safety and security of space.  
In this sense, the proposed Code is not just a looming failure on the horizon but, to use another 
helpful space metaphor, it is also a black hole exerting a strong gravitational pull that few 
governments seem able to resist.  
                                                 
342 160 Cong. Rec. S6936 (daily ed. Jan. 2, 2015) (Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Secretary of State for 
Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Vitter (November 17, 2014)) (“At this time, the Administration has made no decision to 
propose the negotiation of a debris-generating ASAT testing moratorium… we have not made a specific proposal to 
allies for negotiation of a debris-generating ASAT testing moratorium.”). 
343 Id. (Letter from Julia Frifield, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs, to Sen. Vitter, (December 10, 
2014) (“The administration has no plans to propose the negotiation of a debris-generating ASAT testing moratorium 
at this time…Currently, our diplomatic focus is on the development of an International Code of Conduct on Outer 
Space Activities.”). 
